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I. INTRODUCTION
The belief in the utility of observing a witness' demeanor in assess-
ing his or her credibility at trial-"demeanor evidence"-has roots
deep in the history of jurisprudence. Relying on a principle almost
three thousand years old, the legal community has instilled in its judi-
cial framework the fundamental premise that "the opportunity... to
view the demeanor of a witness is of great value"1 in deciding whether
that witness is telling the truth. Since ascertaining truth is the very
function of the trial,2 the deliberate perpetuation of any such device
which reputedly enhances "the accuracy of the truth-determining pro-
cess"3 is hardly surprising. The principle can be traced as a juridical
axiom from the times of the early Roman judex4 to the thirteenth-
and fourteenth-century Postglossators,5 through the earliest English
common law6 to the foundations of this country's early legal reason-
ing.7 Case law in the United States has endowed demeanor evidence
with precedential value to the extent that the concept is reified in both
case law8 and the Federal Rules of Evidence. 9 In both civil and crimi-
nal trials, jurors are instructed that they may take the demeanor,
manner, and conduct of witnesses into account when assessing witness
evidence and credibility.10 Research has indicated that when there is
disagreement among witnesses, jurors often tend to make their deter-
minations based on witnesses' demeanor, rather than on the substance
of witness testimony."1 It has long been recognized that these deter-
minations are of the utmost importance, as "[t]he jury's estimate of
the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be deter-
minative of guilt or innocence."12
Extensive empirical research has been conducted, however, on the
1. Olin G. Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075 (1991).
2. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
3. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
4. NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d 484, 487-88 (2d Cir. 1952).
5. Id. at 488.
6. See Anne Rowley, The Sixth Amendment Right of Defendants to Confront Ad-
verse Witnesses, 26 AM. CriM. L. REV. 1547, 1551 (1989); Daniel H. Pollitt, The
Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. PUB. L. 381 (1959).
7. See Rowley, supra note 6, at 1551; Pollitt, supra note 6, at 398-400.
8. See infra part III.
9. See FED. R. EVID. Article VIII, advisory committee's Introductory Note ("The de-
meanor of the witness traditionally has been believed to furnish trier and oppo-
nent with valuable clues.").
10. See infra text accompanying notes 41-45.
11. See Arthur D. Austin, Why Jurors Don't Heed the Trial, NAT'L L.J., August 12,
1985, at 18; Kenneth K. Sereno, Source Credibility, 28 J. FORENSIC Sci. 532, 534-35
(1983).
12. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).
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act of deception and its perception and detection by observers.'3 One
branch of such research has focused on efforts to quantify experimen-
tally the skill of ordinary subjects in judging whether a speaker (or
witness14) is engaging in deceptive behavior (or testimony).15 Specifi-
cally, this research is designed to answer whether it is possible for
such subjects to detect in a speaker's behavior indicia of attempted
deception. Social scientists have thus effectively subjected to empiri-
cal trial the validity of the demeanor evidence concept described
above. Surprisingly, successive testing of this "fundamental" legal
precept has repeatedly demonstrated its fallacy. The studies establish
that typical subjects are unable to use the "manner and conduct" of a
speaker to successfully detect deceptive information on any reliable
basis.16
This article will explain why the long-standing confidence in the
principle of demeanor evidence is unfounded, and it will suggest sim-
ple yet effective reforms to remedy the underlying problems. Part II
gives a brief overview of the deficiency of the concept and of its under-
13. See, e.g., Bella M. DePaulo et al., Deceiving and Detecting Deceit, in THE SELF
AND SOCIAL LIFE 323 (Barry R. Schlencker ed., 1985)(reviewing research); Miron
Zuckerman et al., Verbal and Nonverbal Communication of Deception, 14 AD-
VANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 1 (1981)(reviewing research); Robert E.
Kraut, Humans as Lie Detectors: Some Second Thoughts, 30 J. COMM. 209 (1980).
14. This article will apply findings from a subject observing a speaker in a psycholo-
gists laboratory to the ability of a jury to discern a witness' deception. In both
situations, a randomly chosen person (juror or subject) is presented with a poten-
tially deceptive speaker and asked to judge that speaker's credibility. As Profes-
sor Wellborn points out, "[clourtrooms have more in common with laboratories
than with 'real life'." Wellborn, supra note 1, at 1079. Various studies have, in
fact, used a courtroom settings instead of laboratories to increase the external
validity of the studies. See Peter D. Blanck et al., The Appearance of Justice:
Judges' Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior in Criminal Trials, 38 STAN. L. REV. 89,
90 (1985); Gordon D. Hemsley & Anthony N. Doob, The Effect of Looking Behav-
ior on Perceptions of a Communicator's Credibility, 8 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
136 (1978); Gerald R. Miller & Judee K. Burgoon, Factors Affecting Assessments
of Witness Credibility, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 169 (Robert M.
Bray & Norbert L. Kerr eds., 1978); GERALD R. MILLER & NORMAN E. FONTES,
THE EFFECTS OF VIDEOTAPED COURT MATERIALS ON JUROR RESPONSE 11-42
(1978). Other research has focused on the extent to which it is actually possible
to increase external validity. See generally Robert M. Bray & Norbert L. Kerr,
Methodological Considerations in the Study of the Psychology of the Courtroom,
in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 287 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray
eds., 1982); EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW: REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW (1981); Ebbe B.
Ebbessen & Vladimir J. Konecni, On the External Validity of Decision-Making
Research- What Do We Know About Decisions in the Real World, in COGNITIVE
PROCESSES IN CHOICE AND DECISION BEHAVIOR 21 (Thomas S. Wallsten ed., 1980).
15. Although I will also use the terms "deception" and "perjury" and their deriva-
tives interchangeably, it is with a caveat that I do so. Deception entails an inten-
tion to mislead, while perjury refers primarily to an outright lie under oath.
16. See infra part IV.
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pinnings. Part III examines demeanor evidence in the judicial process,
summarizing the history of the demeanor concept and its juridical
antecedents, with particular emphasis on the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment. Part IV reviews social science literature on
the subject of deception to illustrate the premise's invalidity. Finally,
Part V examines the implications such evidence has for the legal
process.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM
A. Social Science and the Law
As a preliminary matter, the threshold question might be whether
it is appropriate for empirical findings from social science or other
fields to be applied to the law. It is not an easy question, in fact, and
the controversies still rage over the admissibility of certain expert tes-
timony and of DNA analyses, of the validity of eyewitness testimony,
and of other scientific advances. To what extent should the discover-
ies of social science be taken into account in the process of judicial
reasoning?
I will address this broader issue in an abridged manner, and leave a
more extensive discussion for a subsequent article. The analysis of ne-
cessity involves discussions of the overarching themes and purposes of
psychology and of the law,17 of the legal foundations for accepting new
facts and discoveries,15 and of constitutional polemics of natural ver-
sus positive law.19 As is clear from this Article, I favor the application
of clearly demonstrated, accepted theories of social science when they
can reasonably be applied to the highly insular judicial process. An
example would be the recent research indicating that, contrary to both
popular attitudes and Supreme Court decisions, the confidence that a
particular witness shows in a judgment he or she makes, specifically in
the area of an eyewitness identification, is not a good indicator of the
accuracy of that judgment.20 Analogous studies have been conducted
17. One purpose of psychology is to accumulate knowledge. Should such knowledge
be applied sparingly, once it is proven and incontrovertible, or should it be inte-
grated into daily life as it is discovered, in order to improve society as quickly and
efficiently as possible? Likewise, is the purpose of law to protect society from
individuals' itinerant moralities, or to protect individuals from the diffused apa-
thy, intolerance, or active prejudice of society's majorities, or some unspecified
combination of these extremes?
18. E.g., applying a sort of Frye test to academia and advocacy.
19. Is "law" a schema of rigid rules to be applied equally to everyone and immutably
to novel situations, or should such novelties and "evolving standards" of morality,
decency, or knowledge have more of an influence on established rules?
20. Compare Vicki L. Smith et al., Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: Within-
Versus Between-Subjects Correlations, 74 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 356 (1989) [and]
Gary L. Wells & D. Murray, Eyewitness confidence, in 1 EYEWrrNESS TESTMONY:
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIvES 155 (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus eds.,
1160 [Vol. 72:1157
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on the topic of deception: empirical studies consistently demonstrate
that confidence in one's ability to detect lies is unrelated to the actual
accuracy of the statements.21
Psychology and social science should not, however, be given carte
blanche to revamp the law. An argument based on neo-Freudian prin-
ciples that a murder should be excused because the murderer had an
unresolved Oedipal complex and the victim reminded him of his fa-
ther should not change the legal consequences of the act. Similarly, a
rapist's actions should not be rationalized by the assertion that he is
aggressive and fixated in the genital stage. These psychological theo-
ries, perhaps helpful in determining the appropriate clinical treat-
ment, should not function to subvert viable legal standards.22 Grayer
areas exist as well. Issues in perceptual and personality psychology
relate to the differing perceptions formed by a police officer and a
home owner about the intimidation present during a search request.23
Such issues are relevant in both psychological and legal domains, but
do they properly fall under the psycholegal rubric? And to what ex-
tent should such findings influence traditional evidentiary and other
procedural perceptions of law? My reply is of necessity both straight-
forward and complex. Arguments that are based on social science and
designed to inspire changes in the law, should be subjected to a simple
preliminary standard: does the recommended change help to further
the ends of the judicial process?2 4 This criterion will obviously engen-
der more fundamental problems, but is the yardstick by which new
hypotheses should be measured.2 5 Articles such as the one at hand,
1984), with Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972)(eyewitness confidence important
predictor of identification accuracy)[and] Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98
(1976)(reaffirming confidence standard).
21. See, eg., Ginter Kohnken, Training Police Officers to Detect Deceptive Eyewit-
ness Statements: Does it Work?, 2 Soc. BEHAv. 1 (1987); Bella M. DePaulo &
Roger L. Pfeifer, On-the-job Experience and Skill at Detecting Deception, 16 J.
APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 249 (1986).
22. For example, a discussion of a variation on this theme, the claim of a multiple-
personality disorder (MPD) in which an "alternate" persona committed a double
homicide, appears in MICHAEL P. WEISSBERG, THE FIRST SIN OF Ross MICHAEL
CARLSON (1992). The psychiatrist author concludes that the murderer had been
lying all along, and had planned his defense far in advance. These cautions, how-
ever, should not be read to advocate an unsympathetic view towards all such de-
fenses. My assertion applies to the potential for broad legal policies based on
nebulous or arguable claims such as those based on MPD.
23. See, e.g., Dorothy K. Kagehiro & Ralph B. Taylor, Exploring the Fourth Amend.
ment Searches Based on Consent, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 21-36
(Dorothy K. Kagehiro & William S. Laufer eds., 1991).
24. This is, essentially, a more expansive description of the Federal Rule of Evidence
which governs the admissibility of expert opinion and deems admissible "kmowl-
edge [which] will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence." FED. R.
Evm. 702. [This article was written prior to the decision in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993)].
25. Cf. Solomon M. Fulero, The Role of Behavioral Research in the Free Press/Fair
1993]
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the Smith, Kassin, and Ellsworth article26 or that of Blanck, Rosen-
thal, and Cordell,27 offer suggestions that help focus the "truth-seek-
ing process" into a more effective system, and satisfy that standard.
Thus, it is appropriate to analyze the ramifications that empirical re-
search may have for the legal perspective on demeanor evidence.
Demonstrating the invalidity of the legal perspective on demeanor evi-
dence demands reappraisal of some areas of evidentiary policy.
B. Perceived and Actual Deception
The problem with the value ascribed to demeanor evidence rests
on an important discrepancy largely ignored by case law and by histor-
ical and legal background. Case law focuses on the use of demeanor in
assessing the "credibility" and the "reliability" of a witness's evidence,
on the "trustworthiness of witnesses" 28 or on whether a witness is
"worthy of belief."29 No opinion, however, suggests that demeanor is
a guide to the actual truth of a witness's testimony, that ideal goal of
trial, but to the weight that should be accorded to that testimony. This
theoretical leap from measuring the reliability of a witness, as judged
by his demeanor, to a measure of the underlying truth of the testi-
mony3O is the underpinning of the very concept of demeanor evidence.
Triers of fact subscribe to an extreme version offalsus in uno3l,falsus
in omnibus 32 when they make judgments of perjury or deception on
the basis of a witness's gaze, his "nervous" smile or his shifting
posture.
Empirical findings demonstrate that the behavioral cues used by
jurors and other observers to perceive and measure deceptive dis-
course are "more strongly associated with judgments of deception
than with actual deception."3 3 In other words, a wipe of the hand, a
lick of the lips, or a stammer in a witness's speech will yield a judg-
Trial Controversy, 11 LAw AND HuM. BEHAV. 259, 263 (1987)(regarding problems
with pretrial publicity: if "the research literature demonstrates 'to a reasonable
degree of probability' that an effect exists, then the literature ought to be
presented to the trier of fact in a legal context"). An excellent discussion of the
appropriateness of communicating research findings to triers of fact is put forth
by Kipling D. Williams et al., Eyewitness Evidence and Testimony, in HANDBOOK
OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAw 141,155-160 (Dorothy K. Kagehiro & William S. Laufer
eds., 1991), which analyzes both legal and psychological findings on the issue.
26. Supra note 20.
27. Supra note 14.
28. NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d 484, 488 (2d Cir. 1952)(citations omitted).
29. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
30. The theoretical leap is also made from judgments about demeanor to other signif-
icant judgments. See infra part III(A).
31. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 543 (5th ed. 1979).
32. Id




ment of deception far more often than a deception on the part of that
witness actually occurs.S4
This is the fundamental problem with demeanor evidence as glori-
fied by the judicial process. Social science has produced overwhelming
evidence refuting the ability of people to identify that a witness is ly-
ing when the witness is actually being deceptive.35 Yet jurists persist
in the fallacious belief-unfounded yet attributed to common sense-
that this ability exists. Whether a witness is giving deceptive testi-
mony or not, if he exhibits certain "telltale indicators"36 which have
always been perceived as resulting from an act of deception, then the
witness is perceived as being deceptive in his testimony. As described
in Part IV of this article, this ratiocination, circular at best, is demon-
strably false.
C. Operational Definitions
Detractors would contend that, as long as there is a quantified, rea-
sonable correspondence 37 between indicators of actual and perceived
deception, the validity of the legal premise is reasonable. However,
while it may be that there is some correlation between perceived and
actual deception, it is indisputably an imperfect correlation. Clearly, it
cannot be argued that this is "good enough" for trial practice. It is
imperative that the trier of fact apply higher standards for seeking the
accuracy of any testimony. The integrity of the truth-seeking process
is irremediably violated when a capricious or even uninformed judg-
ment is made or perpetuated as to how a particular factor serves the
ends of that process. Where such a factor can be refined to better
serve the truth-seeking process, such refinement is undoubtedly an
advisable change. Furthermore, when the underlying assumptions
supporting a premise are shaky or manifestly false, it is proper to reas-
sess that premise.
Even assuming arguendo that the distinction between actual and
perceived deception is a recondite or manufactured incongruity, two
34. This does not necessarily imply that those behavioral cues which lead to judg-
ments of perceived deception have no homology at all with those cues displayed
by actual deceptive witnesses. In fact, one empirical study obtained a statistical
correlation between a list of indicia of perceived deception and a list of actual
deception indicia. Bella M. DePaulo et al., Actual and Perceived Cues to Decep-
tion: A Closer Look at Speech, 3 BAsic AND APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 291 (1982).
Thus, there is correspondence between those cues which are simply associated
with observers guessing that a witness is lying and those which actually tend to be
displayed by a perjurious witness. Id. Again, however, it is indisputable that
"there are more cues which reliably predict perceptions of deception than actual
deception." Zuckerman et al., supra note 13, at 39.
35. See infra part IV.
36. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
37. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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closely connected problems impugn the validity of demeanor evidence.
The first is the question of precisely which cues or indicators are con-
sidered symptomatic of deceptive discourse. Although a wide variety
of cues are subsumed under the legal rubric of "demeanor," 38 certain
of these cues are actually vastly more helpful to an observer in de-
tecting genuine deception than others.39 In practice, however, the
legal construct of demeanor evidence ignores this hierarchy and actu-
ally assigns the greatest weight to the least helpful cues.40 To some
extent this is due to the historical background of both the demeanor
evidence premise and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment.
This misplaced emphasis is also a function of the second problem,
which is a matter of operational definitions. In law, the term "de-
meanor" has expanded to encompass many characteristics displayed
by witnesses:
the tone of voice in which a witness' statement is made, the hesitation or read-
iness with which his answers are given, the look of the witness, his carriage,
his evidences of surprise, his gestures, his zeal, his bearing, his expression, his
yawns, the use of his eyes, his furtive or meaning glances, or his shrugs, the
pitch of his voice, his self-possession or embarrassment, his air of candor or
seeming levity.4 '
In sharp contrast, the lay definition of "demeanor" is much more fo-
cused on behavioral indicia, emphasizing external appearance and
physical cues displayed by a witness: "[o]utward behavior; manner;
conduct; deportment."42 Thus, even jurors who believe they under-
stand exactly what to look for when told they may use demeanor as an
index of a witness's credibility, will focus on those aspects which they
believe define the term: outward physical behaviors, the "batting of
an eye, the coloring of the cheek, or the twiddling of the thumbs."4 3
In addition, the term "demeanor" is less often used in a jury charge or
preliminary instructions than the terms "manner and conduct," terms
that focus the jurors' attention on indicia that are nonverbal.44 More-
38. See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
39. See infra part IV(C).
40. As described in the next heading, some trial instructions explicitly focus juror
attention to presumptively helpful cues which are actually misleading. Other in-
structions, however, implicitly disserve the demeanor evidence principle. For ex-
ample, the common instruction that all witnesses should be presumed to be
telling the truth actually changes an observer's focus of attention while he or she
is regarding the speaker. See, e.g., Miron Zuckerman et al., Nonverbal Strategies
for Decoding Deception, 6 J. NONVERBAL BEHAV. 171 (1982)(assumption that
speaker is truthful increases reliance on certain indicia in judgments of decep-
tion); see also infra part IV.
41. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 430 (6th ed. 1990)(citing Rains v. Rains, 8 A.2d 715, 717
(1939)).
42. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 375 (2nd ed. 1984).
43. Chapman v. Troy Laundry Co., 47 P.2d 1054, 1062 (1935).
44. There is, moreover, a distinct trend toward drawing juror attention to specific
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over, it is apparent that as a practical matter, the law actually regards
this lay definition as definitive.45
Together, these two problems detract from the validity of de-
meanor evidence. A trier of fact, when using demeanor as a gauge of a
witness's credibility, places emphasis on cues that have been shown to
be not only unhelpful but actually misleading. Thus, not only is the
use of demeanor evidence unhelpful in the detection of deception, but
given the cues on which the legal process focuses, it in fact "diminishes
rather than enhances the accuracy of credibility judgments."46
III. DEMEANOR AND THE LAW
In all its long history, rarely has the legal premise described above
been more explicitly articulated than by Judge Freedman:
Demeanor is of the utmost importance in the determination of the credibility
of a witness. The innumerable telltale indicators which fall from a witness
actions as opposed to general impressions. "In making your assessment [of a wit-
ness's credibility] you should carefully scrutinize... each witness's ... appear-
ance and manner while on the witness stand." EDWARD J. DEVrrr ET AL., 1
FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 15.01 (4th ed.
1992); "[i]n considering what testimony to believe, consider.., the manner of the
witness while testifying." MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR
THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE EIGHTH CmcUrr, Instruction No. 3.04 (1992); "[i]n
deciding what to believe, you may consider... (3) the witness's manner while
testifying...." MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT, Instruction No. 1.07 (1992); "[in considering the testimony of any wit-
ness, you may take into account ... his manner while testifying .. " FEDERAL
CRIINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, Instruction No. 1.02
(1980); "[a]sk yourself how the witness acted while testifying. Did the witness
appear honest? Or did the witness appear to be lying?" PATTERN CRIMNAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE DISTRICT JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE SIXTH CmCuIT, In-
struction No. 1.07 (1991); "[y]ou should decide whether you believe what each
witness had to say.... Did the person impress you as honest?" PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE DISTRICT JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT,
CRM INAL CASES, Instruction No. 1.09 (1990); "[i]n deciding whether you believe
or do not believe any witness I suggest you ask yourself a few questions: Did the
person impress you as one who was telling the truth?" PATTERN JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS OF THE DISTRICT JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, CRIMI-
NAL CASES, Basic Instruction No. 5 (1985).
This focus is especially dangerous in light of strong evidence that directing an
observer's attention to particular aspects of a witness or his testimony can yield
vastly different judgments about the witness' veracity. See infra notes 266-274
and accompanying text.
45. See Faircloth v. State, 208 So.2d 66,70 (1968)("relates to physical appearance; 'out-
ward bearing or behavior' ")(citation omitted).
46. Wellborn, supra note 1, at 1075. Professor Wellborn is inaccurate, however, in
the extent to which he considers demeanor useless. He misconstrues the social
science findings which demonstrate that vocal cues such as tone of voice or hesita-
tions in speech are actually helpful in detecting deception, while the majority of
facial and other physical cues are misleading. It is this important distinction
which this article addresses. Compare parts Ill and IV infra.
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during the course of his examination are often much more of an indication to
judge or jury of his credibility and the reliability of his evidence than is the
literal meaning of his words.4 7
He continued, "observation of the demeanor of the witness confers on
the fact finder [a superior advantage]"48 in ascertaining the truth at
trial. The assumption that "telltale indicators" will be displayed by a
perjurious witness reflects the oft-quoted, nearly three-thousand year
old description of a liar: "He does not answer questions, or they are
evasive answers; he speaks nonsense, rubs the great toe along the
ground, and shivers; his face is discolored; he rubs the roots of the hair
with his fingers."49 Judge Frank, an ardent supporter of demeanor
evidence, emphasized the following indicia: "his manners, his intona-
tions, his grimaces, his features, and the like ..... "o Judge Frank illus-
trated the traditional standpoint when he wrote, "[a]ll of us know that,
in every-day life, the way a man behaves when he tells a story-his
intonations, his fidgetings or composure, his yawns, the use of his eyes,
his air of candor or evasiveness-may furnish valuable clues to his re-
liability .... So the courts have concluded."s1 For centuries, jurists
have used these and similar indicia as axiomatic in credibility judg-
ments, implicating demeanor both directly and indirectly in diverse
areas of law.5 2
Four examples of these areas illustrate the extent to which de-
meanor evidence now inheres in the judicial system.
47. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 548 (3rd Cir. 1967).
48. Id. at 549.
49. Paul V. Trovillo, A History of Lie Detection, 29 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 848,
849 (1939).
50. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Havana Madrid Restaurant Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.
1949).
51. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 21 (1950)
52. Since this article analyzes the actual validity of the demeanor evidence construct
as accepted at its most basic, it will not address questions that arise from an as-
sumption that the construct is valid. Such questions include when demeanor evi-
dence can qualify as substantive rather than simply credibility evidence; when a
witness or other party's demeanor in the courtroom may properly be assessed by
the trier of fact; and to what extent a trial judge may and/or should preserve for
the record the specific behavioral elements he or she used in making a judgment
based on demeanor. Such issues are discussed more thoroughly in Edward J. Im-
winkelreid, Demeanor Impeachment Law and Tactics, 9 Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc.
183 (1985).
A related topic examines the use of demeanor evidence in detecting false testi-
mony that is not deliberate deceit but is merely inaccurate. An erroneous identi-
fication by an eyewitness who is nevertheless confident and sincere in that
identification would fall into this category. While Professor Wellborn address
this topic cogently, see Wellborn, supra note 1, it is an inappropriate corollary to
the main topic of demeanor evidence. An observer cannot detect deceit by any
means if it does not exist. If a witness is convinced of the veracity of his state-
ments, "telltale indicators" that he is lying should not be apparent.
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A. Sentence Enhancements for Mendacity
The first example of the use of demeanor evidence in the judicial
process is subtle, but it has potentially drastic ramifications. Fifteen
years ago, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Grayson,5 3 ad-
dressed the issue of a trial court's use of a convicted defendant's men-
dacity at trial in enhancing that defendant's sentence. Affirming
ChWfftn v. Stynchcombe,54 the Court relied on language which tena-
ciously held to the belief in the ease of observing a witness and thus
discerning his thoughts: "[o]pportunity to observe the defendant, par-
ticularly if he chose to take the stand in his defense, can often provide
useful insights into an appropriate disposition." 55 Grayson endorses
the contentions both that a defendant's "truthfulness or mendacity
while testifying on his own behalf... [is] probative of his attitudes
toward society"56 and that "the defendant's readiness to lie under oath
... [is] among the more precise and concrete of the available indicia"57
to be used by a judge at sentencing.
Thus, a convicted defendant, who testified on his own behalf but
was viewed by the trial judge-perhaps on the basis of demeanor-to
have perjured himself, could be deemed to have diminished "prospects
for rehabilitation"5 8 at sentencing. All hope can be given up as to "the
likelihood that he will transgress no more, the hope that he may re-
spond to rehabilitative efforts to assist with a lawful future career, the
degree to which he does or does not deem himself at war with his soci-
ety."59 Under pre-Sentencing Guidelines law, based solely on an as-
sessment of the defendant's antipathy for society manifested as
perjury, a judge could order an increased sentence, albeit "within the
limitations fixed by statute." 60 Even under the current Guidelines
sentencing, a convicted defendant may be subjected to an increase of
53. 438 U.S. 41 (1978).
54. 412 U.S. 17, 33 (1973)("Jury sentencing, based on each jury's assessment of the
evidence it hears and appraisal of the demeanor and character of the accused, is a
legitimate practice.").
55. ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Sentencing Alternatives and
Procedures § 5.1 (Draft 1968), quoted in United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50
(1978).
56. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50 (1978).
57. United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233, 1236 (2d Cir. 1974).
58. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 52 (1978).
59. United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233, 1236 (2d Cir. 1974).
60. Humes v. United States, 186 F.2d 875, 878 (10th Cir. 1951). See, e.g., United States
v. Pavlico, 961 F.2d 440, 443 (4th Cir. 1992)(increase for perjury in pre-Guidelines
case); see also United States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141, 154-55 (D.C. Cir. 1982)(sen-
tencing judge may infer from testimony and demeanor of witnesses at trial that
defendant coerced or allowed defense witness to commit perjury); Fabiano v.
Wheeler, 583 F.2d 265, 269-70 (6th Cir. 1978)(sentencing judge may infer from
testimony and demeanor of witnesses at trial that defendant coerced or allowed
defense witness to commit perjury).
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two offense levels if it is found that he "willfully obstructed or im-
peded ... the administration of justice" by giving false testimony or
statements.6 1
Accordingly, a defendant who gives testimony in a calm, straight-
forward manner, could be perceived by the presiding judge as calcu-
lated, unrepentant, impertinent, and brazen in the defendant's
disregard for the process of justice. This composure, however, could as
easily be due to repetitious practicing of testimony with counsel.62 A
judge who makes a determination about a convicted defendant's men-
dacity, based primarily on that defendant's demeanor while testifying
on his own behalf, could increase the defendant's sentence by years,6 3
without regard to the attenuated nature of the factors on which the
decision is based.6 4 Clearly, where determinations are based on a dis-
61. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 3C1.1 (1987). See also, United States v.
Noland, 960 F.2d 1384, 1390-91 (8th Cir. 1992) (district court's opportunity to judge
witnesses' credibility); United States v. Seabolt, 958 F.2d 231, 233-34 (8th Cir.
1992)(finding of perjury based on the witnesses' demeanor); United States v. Os-
borne, 931 F.2d 1139, 1152 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. McDonald, 935 F.2d
1212, 1219 (11th Cir. 1991)(district court "uniquely suited" to make judgment of
perjury since able to observe demeanor of witness); United States v. Beaulieu, 900
F.2d 1537, 1540 (10th Cir. 1990)(judge's determination that defendant committed
perjury based on personal observation of defendant's demeanor, which gives ade-
quate "indicia of reliability"); see also United States v. Urioechea-Casallas, 946
F.2d 162 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Stubbs, 944 F.2d 828 (11th Cir. 1991).
This provision is qualified, however, in that when it is applied "suspect testi-
mony and statements should be evaluated in a light most favorable to the defend-
ant." UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELMNES § 3C1.1, Application Note 2 (1987).
Recent decisions, under Guidelines law, have apparently begun to restrict a sen-
tencing court's ability to enhance a defendant's sentence for obstruction of jus-
tice. See, e.g., United States v. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d 178,182-85 (4th Cir. 1991). The
restriction is specifically related to the added burden such enhancements place on
defendants, and not to the dangers associated with using the defendant's de-
meanor as a gauge of mendacity. Id. at 185.
62. This factor, previous rehearsal or "coaching," can itself have implications for the
utility of demeanor evidence. Wellborn, supra note 1, at 1079. See generally,
John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68 TEX. L. REV. 277, 288-89, 298-300
(1989); Gerald R. Miller et al., Sef-monitoring, Rehearsal, and Deceptive Com-
munication, 10 HUM. COMM. RES. 97, 98-99, 114 (1983). See also Joshua A. Fish-
man, Some Current Research Needs in the Psychology of Testimony, 13 J. Soc.
ISSuES 60, 64-65 (1957).
63. Under certain circumstances, a Guidelines sentence could conceivably be in-
creased by more than ten years, given a two-level adjustment for obstructing or
impeding justice.
64. Jurists take this danger into account in other contexts such as when a defendant
takes the stand at a competence or sanity hearing. See Commonwealth v.
Louraine, 453 N.E.2d 437,442 (Mass. 1983). A defendant should not testify at such
a hearing if he is under the influence of strong medication, for "[w]hen mental
competency is at issue, the right to offer testimony involves more than mere
verbalization." State v. Maryott, 492 P.2d 239 (Wash. App. 1971). The right "in-
cludes the [right] to offer his demeanor in an unmedicated state." Id. Further,
"the jury are [sic] likely to assess the... evidence before them with reference to
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putable factor such as demeanor, such determinations may lead to
misinterpretations with grave consequences. 63
B. Trial Tactics
If there is indeed a disparity between behaviors that lead to percep-
tions of perjury and behaviors which are true indicators of mendac-
ity,66 its importance is most evident in the stratagems and devices
wielded by trial attorneys to use witness demeanor in attacking credi-
bility.67 The trial tactics include dressing a defendant in a particular
manner,6 8 requesting that an adverse witness allow the jury "a good
look at [him],"69 and pre-trial interviewing of specific witness and re-
searching demeanor evidence in general.70 In fact, since the early part
of this century commentators have advocated that attorneys cultivate
a familiarity with social science studies regarding demeanor.71 The
corpus of literature about the importance of demeanor evidence at
trial, both in terms of its effect on juries72 and in terms of methods
the defendant's demeanor. [1ff the defendant appears calm and controlled at trial
[due to the medication's influence], the jury may well discount any testimony that
the defendant [was incompetent]." Commonwealth v. Louraine, 453 N.E.2d 437,
442 (emphasis added).
65. It is true, of course, that a trier of fact may not make a finding of fact based solely
on disbelief of testimony: "there must be more than the batting of an eye, the
coloring of the cheek, or the twiddling of the thumbs as a basis for finding facts."
Chapman v. Troy Laundry Co., 47 P.2d 1054, 1062 (1935).
66. See supra part H(A).
67. See generally Imwinkelreid, supra note 52.
68. An example of this tactic is evident in Patricia Hearst's demure attire at her trial
for bank robbery. It has been suggested that F. Lee Bailey, her counsel, required
her to dress in this manner to present a reserved and impassive appearance which
would "bolster his claim that her will and judgment were overborne by her cap-
trs .... " DAVID L. HERBERT AND ROGER K. BARRET, ATToRNEY's MASTER
GUIDE TO COURTROOM PSYCHOLOGY: HOW TO APPLY BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE TECH-
NIQUES FOR NEW TRIAL SuccEss 308-09 (1981).
69. Clarence Darrow, in the Unger trial, used this device particularly skillfully. See
FRANCis X. BUSCH, 3 LAw AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALs 751 (encyc. ed. 1960). A
key prosecution witness
was a squat, heavy-set man of medium height.... His swollen face,
bleary eyes, puffy eyelids, and reddish-purple nose marked the habitual
drunkard. His shaggy... hair had been stranger to brush or comb for so
long as to have become tangled and matted. His clothes... were covered
with dirt and grease. His huge hands ... were covered with grime.
Id. Darrow's cross-examination was a simple request to the witness to stand up
and turn around, and Darrow drove his point home by saying, "[tihat's all. I just
wanted the jury to get a good look at you." Id.
70. See, e.g., JEFFREY L. KESTLER, QUESTIONiNG TECHNIQUES AND TACTICS § 3.34
(1982).
71. See, e.g., ROLLA R. LONGENECKER, SOME HINTS ON THE TRIAL OF A LAWsUIT 68
(1927).
72. See Wellborn, supra note 1; Stephen H. Peskin, Non-Verbal Communications in
the Courtroom, 3 TRIAL DIPL. J. 8 (1980).
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through which to capitalize on that effect,73 has burgeoned since that
time.
A wide range of approaches has been espoused by litigators for cap-
italizing on this belief in the validity of demeanor evidence. Such ap-
proaches have included reviewing the relevant social science literature
to acquire an overall understanding of the topic74 and paying close at-
tention to a prospective witness's demeanor at a pretrial deposition in
order to plan a more or less aggressive examination at trial.75 Other
approaches include drawing out "favorable" demeanor from friendly
witnesses,7 6 and physically positioning oneself in the most advanta-
geous spot in the courtroom to allow the jury to observe the
"favorable" demeanor of a friendly witness7 7 or the "unfavorable" de-
meanor of an adverse witness. Still others include exploiting an ad-
verse witness's nervousness or discomfort to elicit an unfavorable
demeanor,78 and adhering to particular types of questions which elicit
particular demeanors from a witness.7 9
This practical area of law exemplifies the manner in which de-
meanor evidence has achieved undue importance in the legal frame-
work. Any lawyer who makes it his or her business to research the
relevant social science literature will quickly determine that de-
meanor, as extolled by the courts, is an inappropriate means of de-
tecting perjury and deception.8 0 However, it is precisely because the
construct is so extolled that lawyers, to borrow a phrase, let the "tail
wag the dog."81 Because the accepted supposition is that a particular
type of demeanor implies deception, litigators attempt to provoke such
demeanor. They capitalize on the prevalent assumptions about de-
meanor not by focusing on those aspects of a witness' behavior that in
fact do serve as signals of deception, but by focusing on aspects of be-
73. See Jeffrey Wolfe, Courtroom Choreography: Systematic Use of the Courtroom, 8
TRIAL DIPL. J. 28-32 (1985); K. PHILLIP TAYLOR ET AL., COMMUNICATION STRATE-
GIES FOR TRIAL ATTORNEYS (1984); William A. Trine, Cross-examining the Expert
Witness in the Products Case, 19 TRIAL, November 1983, at 86; FRANCIS L. BAILEY
& HENRY B. ROTHBLATT, SUCCESSFUL TECHNIQUES FOR CRIMINAL TRIALS (1971);
LEO R. FRIEDMAN, ESsENTiALs OF CROSS EXAMINATION § 9.15 (1968); JOHN ALLEN
APPLEMAN, CROSS-EXAMINATION (1963).
74. E.g. Wellborn, supra note 1.
75. Imwinkelreid, supra note 52, at 209.
76. See supra note 62.
77. See generally Captain Jeffrey D. Smith, The Advocate's Use of Social Science Re-
search into Nonverbal and Verbal Communication: Zealous Advocacy or Unethi-
cal Conduct?, 134 MIL. L. REv. 173 (1991).
78. "[Ain adverse witness's credibility can be damaged by slowly moving towards the
witness during cross-examination. Frequently, the witness will... begin to show
signs of anxiety [and] the fact-finder may perceive that the witness is nervous and
stumbling in his or her testimony because he or she is being deceptive." Id.
79. See Edward J. Imwinkelreid, supra note 52.
80. See infra part IV.
81. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 332 (1987)(White, J., dissenting).
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havior that are popularly perceived as accurate indicators of decep-
tion.82 The discrepancy between indicia of actual and of perceived
deception is perpetuated through various trial strategies used to ex-
pose witness demeanor.
C. Out-of-Court Declarations
A third, more widely known instance in which reliance on the
principle of demeanor evidence is apparent is the reluctance to accept
into evidence statements made outside of the courtroom: the hearsay
rule.8 3 Despite its tortuous development under common law, up to the
multifarious intricacies it presents under Article VIII of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the foundation of the rule can be simplified-over-
simplified, perhaps 84-to a basic tenet: out of court statements should
generally be disallowed in court because the demeanor--and thus a
means of assessing the credibility-of the declarant at the time he
made that statement is unavailable to the trier of fact.8 5 That is, "[t]he
importance of demeanor to the jury is one of the rationales for the
82. See supra part H(A).
83. See FED. R. EvID. 801(c)(" 'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.") [and] FED. R. EvID. 802 ("Hearsay is not admissi-
ble. .. ").
84. Obviously, there is more to the hearsay rule than the sole factor of demeanor
evidence. For a more thorough discussion of the rule against hearsay, see McCOR-
UCK ON EViDENCE § 244 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972); 5 JOHN H. WIG-
MORE, EVmENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1364 (James H. Chadburn ed.,
1974); Roy Yasser, Strangulating Hearsay. The Residual Exceptions to the Hear-
say Rule, 11 TEx. TECH L. REv. 587 (1980); John H. Wigmore, The History of the
Hearsay Rule, 17 HARV. L. REv. 437 (1904); Note, Confrontation and the Hearsay
Rule, 75 YALE L.J. 1434 (1966).
85. See, e.g., Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 273 (1912)(reason hearsay is ex-
cluded is that statements are made "without opportunity for the court, jury, or
parties to observe [witnesses'] demeanor"). While this reasoning can apply
equally to the relationship between demeanor evidence and the issues which arise
under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, recent case law has been
careful to distinguish application of the right to confrontation from application of
the hearsay rule. See, ag., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 80 (1970)(right of con-
frontation does not necessarily preclude introduction of evidence that would vio-
late rule against hearsay); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970)(merely
because evidence is admitted in violation of hearsay rule does not necessarily vio-
late confrontation clause and vice versa); see also White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736,
741 (1992); Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3146 (1990); United States v. Ray, 920
F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1990)(admission under hearsay rule does not violate confronta-
tion'clause); Ferrier v. Duckworth, 902 F.2d 545 (7th Cir. 1990), cert denied, Ill S.
Ct. 526 (1990)(confrontation clause does not enact hearsay rule); State v. Hanna,
471 N.W.2d 238 (Wis. App. 1991)(different tests for admission under confrontation
clause and hearsay rule). But see United States v. Morales-Macias, 855 F.2d 693
(10th Cir. 1988)(statements admissible under hearsay rule unobjectionable under
confrontation clause); State v. White, 809 S.W.2d 731 (Mo. App. 1991); State v.
Palomo, 783 P.2d 575, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 80 (Wash. 1989)(even though prop-
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hearsay rule. ... 86
It is not, of course, the only rationale, and demeanor is certainly
not the dispositive factor required for admission of hearsay evidence.
Despite its importance, demeanor evidence can be dispensed with
when other "indicia of reliability"87 are available to validate out of
court statements. Such indicia are the foundation for the current list
of hearsay exceptions in the Federal Rules of Evidence.88 Essentially,
the rule against hearsay prohibits "extrajudicial statements not sub-
ject to cross-examination and not falling within a specific exception to
the rule."8 9
In Ohio v. Roberts,90 the Supreme Court established a framework
that demonstrates the reluctance to admit such evidence and the en-
dorsement of it when other validating indicia are present. Reflecting
the importance ascribed to demeanor evidence, and affirming Barber
v. Page,91 the Court held that the prosecution, when offering adverse
statements or testimony, must produce the declarant or demonstrate
that he or she is "unavailable." 92 If a witness is shown to be unavaila-
ble, the Court then must make an assessment of the surrounding
"indicia of reliability."93 Only if the "trier of fact is afforded a satisfac-
tory basis for evaluating the truthfulness of the prior statement" 94 and
determines that it possesses adequate reliability, is the hearsay state-
erly admitted under hearsay exception, statement must also meet overriding con-
frontation clause concerns).
Academia as well has addressed the relationship between the two principles.
See McCoRMicK, supra note 84, § 252, 749 n.1 (gathering discussions). The rela-
tionship between demeanor evidence and the Confrontation Clause is addressed
infra at part III(D).
86. Imwinkelreid, supra note 52, at 186 n.34.
87. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171,
182 (1987).
88. See FED. R. EVID. 803. A twenty-fourth "residual" exception may be applied to
admit "[a] statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions
but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness," subject to
the court's discretion. FED. R. EvID. 803(24), emphasis added. For an evaluation
of these exceptions see I. Daniel Stewart, Jr. Perception, Hearsay, and Memory:
A Criticism of Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970
UTAH L. REv. 1.
89. Rowley, supra note 6, at 1561; see also WIGMORE, supra note 84, § 1397 (1974)(use
of witness's prior testimony notwithstanding present status as witness is
nontraditional).
90. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
91. 390 U.S. 724-25 (1968). Ruling in terms of the Confrontation Clause, Barber v.
Page required that a good faith effort must be made to obtain such a witness
before a finding of unavailability can be made. Affirming Barber, Berger v. Cali-
fornia, gave it retroactive application, based in part on the importance of the "op-
portunity to assess the credibility of witnesses." 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969).
92. Id at 66.
93. FED. R. EVID. 804.




In sum, the doctrine of demeanor evidence is one of the corner-
stones of the rule prohibiting hearsay evidence. Its significance, how-
ever, may have been obscured in the development of the hearsay rule,
which now focuses on peripheral guarantees of reliability and
credibility.
D. Demeanor and the Confrontation Clause
The importance of demeanor evidence has not been so obscured,
however, in a second area of the legal system. Its entrenchment in the
judicial process is epitomized by its relation to the "Confrontation
Clause" of the Sixth Amendment96 to the United States Constitution.
For centuries-arguably, for millennia-the concept of forcing an ac-
cuser to stand face-to-face with the accused has been predominantly a
function of the belief that "[ilt is always more difficult to tell a lie
about a person 'to his face' than 'behind his back.' 97 This nation's
highest court steadfastly clings to its faith in demeanor evidence when
interpreting Confrontation Clause issues, invoking "something deep in
human nature that regards face-to-face confrontation between accused
and accuser as 'essential to a fair trial .... ' "98
At the most fundamental level, this claim rests on the fact that
actually placing a witness face-to-face with the accused enables both
the accused and the trier of fact to view the witness' demeanor. Two
widely disparate contentions are collapsed into this point, however.
The accepted, but unfounded, claims that there is a "profound effect
upon a witness of standing in the presence of the person [he] ac-
cuses," 99 and that personal confrontation "undoubtedly makes it more
95. Reliability, of course, may be considered implicit, if the statement or testimony
falls within a hearsay exception. See FED. R. EviD. 803 & 804. But see Stewart,
supra note 88 (criticizing the inherent reliability of some of these exceptions).
96. The Amendment states, in relevant part, "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to ... be confronted with the witnesses against him
... ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. This phrase is commonly known as the "Confron-
tation Clause."
97. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988). See also, eg., Commonwealth v. Ludwig,
594 A.2d 281, 284 (Pa. 1991) ("Many people possess the trait of being loose tongued
or willing to say something behind a person's back that they dare not or cannot
truthfully say to his face or under oath in a courtroom. It was probably for this
reason... that [the right of confrontation] was given to every person accused of
crime.").
98. Id. at 1017 (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965)).
99. Id. at 1019. This "effect" allegedly makes the witness "feel quite differently when
he has to repeat his story looking at the man whom he will harm greatly by dis-
torting or mistaking the facts," making him "understand what sort of human be-
ing that man is." Id., (citations omitted). This idealistic approach, still
expounded today, reflects Wigmore's "subjective moral effect," reputedly capable
of "unstring[ing] the nerves of a false witness." WIGMORE, supra note 84, § 1395
n.2. Yet even Wigmore's analysis conceded that this belief was more predomi-
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difficult to lie against someone, particularly if that person is an ac-
cused and present at trial,"100 are substantively different from the
contention that demeanor evidence is helpful in credibility assess-
ments. Both, however, are considered integral parts of the Confronta-
tion Clause.1Ol
On another level, however, the confluence of the two principles
reflects Dean Wigmore's belief that confrontation promotes the relia-
bility of trial testimony through cross-examination, which he consid-
ered the most important aspect of trial.10 2 Cross-examination is
integral in allowing the trier of fact to hear a witness's story from two
or more different perspectives, and one of its "critical goal[s] ... is to
draw out discrediting demeanor to be viewed by the factfinder."103
Specifically, confrontation "mak[es] it possible for the tribunal before
whom the witness appears to judge from his demeanor the credibility
of his evidence."104 Because the Confrontation Clause thus ensures
cross-examination, it "confound[s] and undo[es] the false accuser"10 5
or the lying witness, flustering the witness into exposing a "false" de-
meanor to the jury. While controversy as to the exact "reasons for,
and the basic scope of, the protections offered by the Confrontation
Clause"106 is found in almost every opinion dealing with the Clause,
each accepts the element of demeanor evidence as a crucial one.
It is thus impossible to understand the origin of the enthusiasm
surrounding the demeanor evidence doctrine without examining the
Confrontation Clause. The Clause "reflects a preference for face-to-
nant in "earlier and more emotional times," and that the effect would be more
due to the witness's presence before a formal court or tribunal than to actually
beholding the accused. Id. § 1395.
100. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64, n.6 (1980).
101. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
102. See WIGMORE, supra note 84, § 1395 ('"The main and essential purpose of confron-
tation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination. The
opponent demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the wit-
ness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross-examina-
tion. . . .")(emphasis in original). Contrary to recent decisions such as that of Coy
v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), Wigmore subordinated the importance of physical
confrontation to the opportunity for "direct and personal putting of questions and
obtaining immediate answers." Id.
103. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,64 n.6. See also, United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170,
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 970 (holding that jurors are entitled to see how witness
reacts when cross-examiner catches him in a contradiction or exposes one of his
falsehoods).
104. Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 547 (3rd Cir. 1967). Contrary to the asser-
tion in Coy, this advantage inheres "not from the confrontation between the wit-
ness and the accused, but from the witness's presence before the tribunal." Id.
105. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988).
106. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970)(discussing whether the focus of con-
frontation is procedural or substantive, a strict availability requirement or an op-
portunity to attack a witness's testimony through cross-examination). Compare
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion with Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion.
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face confrontation,"10 7 ensuring the opportunity to regard a witness'
demeanor, and the history of the Clause has ensured a steadfast belief
in the validity of the use of that demeanor evidence. The next sections
of this paper trace the history of the Confrontation Clause as it per-
tains to the construct of demeanor evidence. The paper examines the
development of the Confrontation Clause in common law, through the
Supreme Court holdings which defined and explicated the right to
confrontation, up to cases of especial import from the past three years.
1. Early Development of Demeanor and the Confrontation
Clause
Through Biblical and Roman law,108 as well as modem commenta-
tors' 09 and case lawnO the principle of confronting an accused with
those who denounce him has been firmly established. The principle
was evident in subsequent English law, under which a confrontation
requirement existed: it was necessary for an accuser to make an "ap-
peal" to the court, at which time he was obliged to recite his grievance.
After a flawless recitation of his allegations he was required to docu-
ment the injury, either by a physical exhibition in the case of a wound,
or through the testimony of complaint witnesses to bolster his oath
and contentions.n This requirement of physically confronting a tri-
107. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62 (footnote omitted).
108. E.g., the Roman Emperor Trajan, when asked by the younger Pliny how to treat
the "new sect known as Christians," replied: "anonymous accusations must not
be admitted in evidence as against any one, as it is introducing a dangerous prece-
dent, and out of accord with the spirit of our times." Pollitt, supra note 6, at 384.
[I]n the biblical account of St. Paul's trial for alleged sedition before
Porcius Festus, the Roman governor of Judea, Festus refused to render
judgment against Paul until Paul was physically confronted by his accus-
ers because '[i]t is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man to
die, before that he which is accused have the accusers face to face.'
Acts 25:16, quoted in Rowley, supra note 6, at 1548. These samples epitomize the
factions into which interpreters of the Confrontation Clause have broken. One
faction views the Clause as a substantive rule designed to protect against ex parte
affidavits and other extra-judicial assertions, and at its most extreme, it becomes
a constitutionalization of the hearsay rule. See, e.g., Pollitt, supra note 6, at 384.
The second faction regards the Clause as a procedural right afforded to an ac-
cused at trial and designed to ensure cross-examination or, in the reductionist
view of Coy, simply that both accuser and accused are forced to look at each
other. See, eg., Rowley, supra note 6, at 1548.
109. See Note, Criminal Constitutional Law-Eighth Circuit Applies the Confronta-
tion Clause at a Sentencing Hearing-U.S. v. Fortier, 911 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1990),
17 WMs. MITCHELL L. REV. 829, 831 (1991); Rowley, supra note 6, at 1548; Pollitt,
supra note 6, at 384; Henry S. Sahm, Demeanor Evidence: Elusive and Intangible
Imponderables, 47 A.B.A. J. 580 (1961).
110. See, ag., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015-16 (1988); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S.
474,496 n.25 (1959); NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d 484,487-488 (2d Cir. 1952).
111. See James B. Thayer, The Older Modes of Trial, in 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-
AZMUCAN LEGAL HISTORY 367 (Association of American Law Schools ed., 1908).
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bunal with the injury most likely reduced the number of "anonymous
accusations" that so worried the Emperor Trajan.fl 2 Later, a much
more literal method of "confrontation" was championed by the con-
quering Normans-trial by personal combat. It was a "novel and
hated thing in England. In the so-called 'Laws of William the Con-
queror' it figures as being the Frenchman's mode of trial, and not the
Englishman's,"113 and, according to Thayer, it was not widely
practiced.114
In the early thirteenth century a variation of the "probable cause
hearing" required the accuser to supply two complaint witnesses to
support his claims before an accused was tried.15 At such "hearings"
the defendant was allowed confrontation in the form of cross-exami-
nation of these witnesses.116 Gradually, however, through the thir-
teenth century, this variation and similar forms which afforded an
accused some measure of confrontation or cross-examination were
subordinated to the developing concept of "trial by jury."1 7 When
112. See supra note 108.
113. Id. at 397.
114. According to legal documents of the time, however, it is apparent that this mode
of trial was far more prevalent than Thayer leads us to believe. See Julius J.
Marke, History in the Law Books, N.Y. L.J., September 15, 1992, at 4.
(" 'Glanvill,' a 12th Century legal classic... refers to trial by battle as one of the
chief modes of trial in the King's Court. 'A debt... is proved by the court's
general mode of proof, viz., by writing or by duel.' ") Marke notes that while trial
by battle was gradually replaced by trial by jury, it was due more to the former's
excessive costs. Id While for the most part, trial by battle did become obsolete
by the thirteenth century, appeals to its precedent surface in cases from 1571 and
1638. Id An 1817 trial, in which an appellant literally "threw down a gauntlet"
in strict accordance with the old means of challenge, caused English lawmakers
to officially ban the use of trial by personal combat in an 1819 act of Parliament.
Id.
115. This proviso is a direct result of the canonical rule requiring two witnesses in
order to try an accused for a capital crime.
116. Thayer, supra note 111, at 372.
117. This line of development is most applicable to English jurisprudence, which, due
primarily to the signing of the Magna Carts, "progressed" more rapidly than its
Continental counterparts. Elsewhere, the vagaries of trial were even more de-
pendent on the political or religious power that held sway (although the cases of
the fifty English heretics burned at the stake in the thirteenth and early four-
teenth centuries imply that this could be so more in theory than in practice).
Perhaps the best example is the French King Philip IV's crusade against the
Knights Templar in 1315: after ordering a "dress rehearsal" which imprisoned
and condemned most of the Jews in France, he moved against the Templar order
out of purely financial motives. JOHN J. ROBINSON, DUNGEON, FIRE AND SWORD:
THE KNIGHTS TEMPLAR IN THE CRUSADES 423-69 (1991). His accusations, prosecu-
tion, and subsequent conviction and disbanding of the order was instigated almost
exclusively by means of false informers and anonymous affidavits. Id Based on
the presiding magistrates' fear of the King, when the Templars conducting their




this concept began to progress and become accepted between the late
thirteenth and the early sixteenth centuries, the jury primarily con-
sisted of the witnesses in the case. Chosen from the area in which the
dispute originated, they were presumed to have some knowledge of
the events leading to that dispute.11S Since no actual witnesses were
involved, there was no confrontation or cross-examination as such. 1 9
With the advent of the practice of calling actual material witnesses,
from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, the right of confrontation
began to re-solidify in England. In 1554, Parliament enacted a law
which prescribed, in part, that any adverse witness "shall, if living,
and within the Realm, be brought forth in Person before the party
arraigned if he require the same, and.., say openly in his Hearing,
what they or any of them can against him."120 The, importance of
cross-examination for "confound[ing] ... the false accuser"12 1 and ex-
posing false demeanor was also recognized by this time: Sir Charles
Smith, Queen Elizabeth's Secretary of State, remarked that "[t]he ad-
verse party or his advocates... interrogat[e] sometimes the witnesses
and driv[e] them out of countenance." 122
Despite various abuses12 3 motivated by politics 2 4 and religion,125
118. See Pollitt, supra note 6, at 386.
119. But see Po~litt, supra note 6, at 386-87 (describing means afforded an accused sim-
lar to such devices).
120. 1 & 2 Philip and Mary, ch. 10 (1554). That the phrasing is "in his Hearing" is of
interest, given the discrepancy between the use of vocal cues and nonverbal cues
discussed infra. Obviously, Parliament's legislation was not deliberately
designed to enable the accused simply to hear and not to see the "adverse wit-
ness," but in light of the research (described infra, part IV) regarding the differ-
ential detection of deception when looking at a witness and when listening to
him, it is intriguing to note the difference between this and other similar confron-
tation requirements. See, eg., United States ex rel. Laughlin v. Russell, 282 F.
Supp 106 (E.D. Pa. 1968)(Sixth Amendment requires that accused be permitted to
hear witnesses who testify against him.)
121. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988).
122. 1 SiR W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 335 n.2 (7th ed., 1956).
123. Most analyses of the scant history of the Confrontation Clause agree that its pri-
mary function was to prevent the abuses perpetrated against the holdings of the
acts described above, and similar ones. See White v. llfinois, 112 S. Ct 736, 745-46
(1992); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895)("The primary object of
the [Confrontation Clause] was to prevent depositions or ex [parte affidavits, such
as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu
of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness ... "); California
v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970)
It is sufficient to note that the particular vice that gave impetus to the
confrontation claim was the practice of trying defendants on 'evidence'
which consisted solely of ex parte affidavits or depositions secured by the
examining magistrates, thus denying the defendant the opportunity to
challenge his accuser in a face-to-face encounter in front of the trier of
fact.
Id. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94 (1970)(Harlan, J., concurring)(the "paradig-
matic evil the Confrontation Clause was aimed at" was "trial by affidavit").
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the right of an accused to confrontation, and the attendant reliance on
demeanor evidence, was eventually assured under English law. In
1696, Sir John Fenwick was charged in Parliament with high trea-
son.126 His defense argued: "[o]ur law requires persons to appear and
give their testimony 'viva voce'; and we see that their testimony ap-
pears credible or not by their very countenances and the manner of
their delivery; and their falsity may sometimes be discovered by ques-
tions that the party may ask them .... ,"127 Similarly, by the early
eighteenth century the right to confrontation and cross-examination
had become an integral part of the constitutions and charters of the
American colonies.128 When it came time for the ratification of the
new Federal Constitution, some states, most notably Virginia, Massa-
chusetts, and New York, refused to accept it as drafted because it
lacked procedural safeguards such as confrontation. Without such
safeguards, one legislator asserted, the new Government would have
so few restrictions that it could "institute judicatories, little less inaus-
picious than... the Inquisition."'129 With this heritage, confrontation,
cross-examination, and demeanor evidence were incorporated into the
United States Constitution.13 0
2. Demeanor and Confrontation Under the Supreme Court
Even before interpretation of the Confrontation Clause in Mattox
v. United States,lsl the Supreme Court lauded demeanor evidence. In
early decisions, the Court noted that an appellate court should ordina-
124. The most commonly cited instance of such abuse is the 1603 trial of Sir Walter
Raleigh, in which he was denied occasion to confront the author of the extrajudi-
cial affidavit by which he was convicted and sentenced to death.
125. The Puritan John Lilburne, charged in 1637 with printing and publishing sedi-
tious books (ie. books containing attacks on the bishops of the Church of Eng-
land), refused to answer the trial court's charges until confronted by his accusers.
See Rowley, supra note 6, at 1550-51. His confrontation rights were ignored by
that court and by a higher court, and Lilburne was imprisoned for three years.
Id- When a new Parliament released him in 1640, they passed a resolution which
ensured the right of confrontation thenceforth. Id.
126. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240 (1895).
127. Fenwick's Trial, 13 How. St Tr., 537, 591-92, 638 (1696), in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CON-
STrrUTION 247 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)(emphasis added).
128. Pollitt, supra note 6, at 390-95.
129. 2 JONATHAN ELLiOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 124-25 (1836)(emphasis in original).
130. As with the Raleigh and Lilburne trials alluded to supra, notes 124 & 25, 1 treat
the abuses, trials, and polemics from which the confrontation right in the Colo-
nies emerged in perhaps a more sketchy manner than they merit. This is so be-
cause by this time both the importance of the right and the reliance on demeanor
evidence were firmly established--and thus the controversies did not focus on the
substance of these principles, but rather on whether the right was to be afforded
at all. For a further account of the circumstances under which the right was
realized, see Pollitt, supra note 6, at 390-98; Rowley, supra note 6, at 1550-54.
131. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
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rily defer to a trial court's judgments about witness credibility, since
the lower court is in a position to observe witnesses first hand.132 In
Mattox and in Reagan v. United States,l3 the Court officially recog-
nized the construct that had developed relative to the Confrontation
Clause. Reagan held simply that the jury may consider "demeanor
and conduct upon the witness stand and during the trial."134 Mattox,
however, resulted in a holding which has become the bedrock of the
Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause interpretation:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent
depositions or er poarte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil
cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and
cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not
only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of
compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look
at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which
he gives testimony whether he is worthy of belief.1 3 5
The Mattox Court further refined the confrontation principle, holding
that the two most essential elements were the advantage of "seeing
the witness face to face, and of subjecting [that witness] to the ordeal
of a cross-examination."136 While it may occasionally be subordinated
to important public policies,137 the confrontation right was deemed by
the Mattox Court to be a crucial safeguard against repetition of the
earlier abuses.138 Actual, physical confrontation as well as cross-ex-
amination substantially satisfied the Sixth Amendment right.139
Mattox firmly established the importance of the right to confronta-
tion as a due process issue and laid the groundwork for the subtle dif-
ferentiation between adhibition of its safeguards and those
appertaining to the hearsay rule. However, in the Mattox Confronta-
tion Clause progeny there has always been ambiguity as to which ele-
ments, if any, are indispensable in satisfying the Clause. This
controversy as to the precise fundamental elements of confrontation
has occupied the Supreme Court in recent cases. Specifically, with the
132. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 181 (1895)(opportunity to see witnesses'
demeanor affords assistance in weighing evidence); The Quickstep, 76 U.S. 665,
669 (1869)(trial court best able to reconcile differences in witnesses' testimony
based on opportunity to "observe their demeanor, and compare their degree of
intelligence"); Iasigi v. Brown, 58 U.S. 183 (1854)(disparaging use of "peremptory
directions to return verdicts," as "fatal to the losing party in a court of error, to
which court the appearance, demeanor, and credibility of witnesses can never be
transferred.")
133. 157 U.S. 301 (1895).
134. Id. at 308 (citations omitted).
135. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-243 (1895)(emphasis added).
136. Id. at 244.
137. Id. at 243. See also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990); Coy v. Iowa, 487
U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
138. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
139. Rowley supra note 6, at 1554-55.
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advent of the use of closed-circuit television for the testimony of some
witnesses (especially child victims of abuse),140 dissension over the rel-
ative merits of physical confrontation and cross-examination has been
thrust to the fore. 14 1 This dissension is of paramount importance, as it
is based on the opportunity to view demeanor; therefore, physical con-
frontation may not be considered as important as it has been, if it is
shown that demeanor evidence is not valuable in assessing deception.
The post-Mattox cases reflecting this disagreement can be split
along two discrete lines. The first, pertaining to the importance of
cross-examination, began with concerns over what otherwise confi-
dential material a defendant was entitled to in order to impeach ad-
verse witnesses. This was a prominent issue during the "Red Scare" of
the 1950's, and the substantial restrictions the government attempted
to place on suspected communist sympathizers resulted in the ruling
of Jencks v. United States.142 Subsequent cases differed as to the im-
port of such prejudice, however, and on the issue of cross-examination
and confrontation, the Court ultimately held that "the Confrontation
Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair
opportunity to... cross-examin[e]" a witness, in order to call to the
fact-finder's attention "the reasons for giving scant weight to the wit-
ness' testimony."'143 Further holdings, however, have admonished
that the right to cross-examination is not absolute: "[t]he denial of the
opportunity to cross-examine an adverse witness does not fit within
the limited category of constitutional errors that are deemed prejudi-
cial in every case."144
140. This subject evokes yet another interesting point regarding current confrontation
cases. As discussed infra, the most recent cases involving actual confrontation
arise as a direct result of the emergence of technological practices. If there is a
future case lurking in and among upcoming Sixth Amendment cases which does
not involve sexual abuse of minors, it may give rise to a different ratiocination as
applied to adult witnesses. That is, it is conceivable that the analyses in Coy and
Craig (see infra Part III(D)(3)) could be distinguished from a future case because
the witnesses against the accused are minors. Neither case law nor commenta-
tors have addressed this potential distinction.
141. See especially Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012
(1988).
142. 353 U.S. 657 (1957). In Jencks the Court held that preventing the accused from
reviewing even FBI reports that were redacted by the trial court was "clearly
incompatible with our standards for the administration of criminal justice," Id. at
668. The Court asserted that such prevention restricted the defendant's access to
means of cross-examining the FBI agents who authored the reports. Id.
143. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985).
144. Delaware v. van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 682. See also United States v. Cogwell, 486
F.2d 823 (7th Cir.), cert denied 416 U.S. 959 (1973)(right of cross-examination not
absolute); United States ex rel. Scarpelli v. George, 687 F.2d 1012 (7th Cir. 1982),
cert denied 459 U.S. 1171 (1983)(right to cross-examine adverse witness not abso-
lute and may be limited); United States ex rel. Fuller v. Attorney General, 589
F.Supp. 206 (N.D. Ill. 1984), affid 762 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1985); People v. Car-
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The second line of cases, more important for the present purposes,
have focused on the proper role of actual, physical confrontation at
trial. While some readings of Mattox may have implied that both con-
frontation and cross-examination were fundamental to satisfying the
Clause, the question as to indispensable elements now centers on
which of these two is more important. The disagreement over which
is more important is apparent in the language of two cases: Douglas v.
Alabamnan45 stated that "an adequate opportunity for cross-examina-
tion may satisfy the clause even in the absence of physical confronta-
tion;" 46 and California v. Green'47 stated that "it is this literal right
to 'confront' the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the
values furthered by the confrontation clause."'148
Ostensibly, the former assertion is contrary to the proposition that
demeanor evidence is crucial, for under this reasoning one can imag-
ine a witness being cross-examined while somehow hidden from the
accused, while the latter assertion preserves the importance of de-
meanor evidence by requiring confrontation and exposure to
demenaor. A closer reading, however, indicates that demeanor evi-
dence is so accepted in the judicial process that it is not even a consid-
eration in these two assertions. Both focus on physical confrontation
between the parties, rather than the witness and the trier of fact,
which seems to be the more important. This focus sends these asser-
tions back to Wigmore's more or less discredited "subjective moral ef-
fect" alluded to above.149 Case law continues to conjoin this "effect"
with demeanor evidence, and to assume that every element subsumed
under the rubric of "physical confrontation"--cross-examination and
exposure of the witness to the trier of fact and to the accused-"pro-
video all that the Sixth Amendment demands."15o Thus, case law con-
tinues to fail to distinguish between confrontation, which "ensure[s]
the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant,"151 and
that which can "call] into question the ultimate 'integrity of the fact-
finding process.' "152 This distinction correlates with, and sanctions,
the discrepancy described above between indicia which give rise to
perceptions of deception and indicia which are truly symptomatic of
racedo, 559 N.Y.S.2d 784 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990); In Re James B., 551 N.Y.S.2d 439
(N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1990).
145. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
146. Id. at 418.
147. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
148. Id. at 157.
149. See supra note 99, and accompanying text.
150. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 69 (1980).
151. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990).
152. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973), (quoting Berger v. California,
393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969)).
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deception.153
To a great extent, then, the ultimate issue in terms of the Confron-
tation Clause--and more importantly for present purposes, in terms of
demeanor evidence-turns on the degree to which the Court finds ac-
tual, physical confrontation truly necessary to advance the accuracy of
the fact-finding process. If Wigmore's approach is accepted, and cross-
examination is considered the ultimate goal of the Confrontation
Clause, then the question becomes moot for either of two contrary rea-
sons. First, demeanor evidence can be considered only a dispensable
incidental to "confronting" a witness, as long as there is "the opportu-
nity to cross-examine the witness effectively."' 5 4 Alternatively,
demeanor evidence can be considered the actual goal of cross-exami-
nation, as discussed above.155 If reliability and "accuracy" are sought
through the simple presence of the witness on the stand before the
tribunal, then the question becomes moot because every witness faced
with the imposing gravity of the courtroom will become suddenly
overwhelmed and will in no way attempt to dissemble.156
Thus, physical confrontation, whenever possible, is considered cru-
cial to the Confrontation Clause. 5 7 As long as this is so, and the posi-
tion espoused in Green 5 s is embraced, then a substantial part of the
entire rationale behind the Clause as interpreted by the Court, is sim-
ply based on deluded reasoning. It is actually the exercise of the right,
rather than its interdiction, that has the potential to subvert the accu-
153. See supra part II(A).
154. M. Abbell & M. Sherman, The Bill of Rights in Transnational Criminal Litiga-
tion, 16(8) THE CHAmPiON 22, 26, (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970)).
The Supreme Court recently noted, however, that the thesis that cross-examina-
tion was the "only essential interest preserved by the right" of confrontation is
"on its face implausible, if only because the phrase 'be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him' is an exceedingly strange way to express a guarantee of noth-
ing more than cross-examination." Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1018 n.2 (1988).
155. See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text.
156. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)(confrontation "insures that the
witness will give his statements under oath-thus impressing him with the seri-
ousness of the matter and guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty
for perjury"). Given that this notion was losing its validity even when Wigmore
wrote, however, see supra note 99, it is hard to accept its legitimacy today.
157. The subtle difference between the Clause and the hearsay rule should once again
be noted. The necessity of a witness' physical presence has been obviated by the
hearsay exceptions, present in some form through common law. See, e.g., Mattox
v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895). Since the Clause was never intended to be a
"codification" of the hearsay rule or, indeed, of any rules of evidence, see Califor-
nia v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970), its standards are different. While no ele-
ment has been found to be absolutely indispensable under the right to
confrontation, and physical confrontation has been expressly considered dispen-
sable (see supra note 186 and accompanying text), the case law discussed in the
next section reveals the extent to which confrontation is a fundamental part of
the legal framework.
158. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
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racy of the fact-finding process. Although the Supreme Court and the
legal profession champion the right of physical confrontation, it be-
comes a detriment to finding the truth, not an asset.
3. Cases on Literal Confrontation
In two recent cases the Supreme Court has dealt directly with this
issue, addressing the specific importance of physical, face-to-face con-
frontation. In both Coy v. Iowa 5 9 and Maryland v. Craig,160 such con-
frontation was ostensibly denied the defendant,161 raising the question
of whether the defendant's Sixth Amendment right was violated. To-
gether, the two cases establish the current perspective on physical
confrontation.
a. Coy v. Iowa
Justice Scalia's majority opinion approached the issue of face-to-
face confrontation quite literally, analyzing the etymology of the very
word "confront." Pointing out that previous analyses by the Court fo-
cused on other elements of confrontation,162 Scalia claimed that this
was so precisely because those elements were subject to challenge.
The element of face-to-face confrontation, however, is the "irreducible
literal meaning of the clause." 63 In a quintessential appeal to stare
decisis, Scalia "embellished" the opinion with "references to and quo-
tations from [both] antiquity" and "modern times," in order to support
his contention that "there is something deep in human nature that
regards face-to-face confrontation... as 'essential to a fair trial in a
criminal prosecution.' "1 6 4 Citing the Biblical and Roman allusions
159. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
160. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
161. Both cases involved sexual abuse of one or more minors. In Coy v. Iowa, pursuant
to a state statute, a large screen was placed between the defendant and the wit-
ness stand when the two 13-year-old victims testified. The arrangement allowed
the defendant to see the witnesses dimly, but the witnesses were completely un-
able to see him. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1014-15. Significantly, the screen
allowed both the judge and attorneys, as well as the jury, to see the witnesses, and
both the witnesses' and the defendant's demeanor was visible to the jury during
the testimony. Id. at 1027 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In Maryland v. Craig, also
pursuant to a state statutory provision, the six-year-old victim was allowed to
testify by one-way closed circuit television. Again, while the witness was unable
to see the defendant, the latter could see her, and the judge and jury were able to
view the witness and her demeanor on the television screen. Maryland v. Craig,
497 U.S. 836, 841 (1990).
162. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988)(citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.
673 (1986); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308
(1974) (restrictions on scope of cross-examination); and Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
74 (1970)(admissibility of out-of-court statements)).
163. Id. at 1021.
164. Id. at 1017 (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)).
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above,165 as well as remarks of President Eisenhower 166 and two lines
from Shakespeare's King Richard 11,167 Scalia maintained that con-
frontation is and always has been considered fair because it is fair.168
Scalia based his reasoning on both the usual axiomatic, untested
claims as well as on the principle of demeanor evidence.169 He placed
165. See supra note 108.
166. The President's remarks, from a 1953 speech, are often quoted in Confrontation
Clause analyses. See, e.g., Pollitt, supra note 6, at 381. Eisenhower was describing
a basic code of his home town of Abilene, Kansas, where, he said, one had to come
face to face [with someone] with whom you disagree. You could not
sneak up on him from behind, or do any damage to him, without suffer-
ing the penalty of an outraged citizenry .... In this country, if someone
dislikes you, or accuses you, he must come up in front. He cannot hide
behind the shadow.
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017-18 (1988)(emphasis added).
Far from being a solid buttress of Scalia's position on the issue, however, Pres-
ident Eisenhower's remarks seem better suited to a claim that personal integrity
is a fundamental national precept which requires courage to stand up to someone
before expressing disagreement.
167. Shakespeare's lines are quoted even more often than President Eisenhower's.
Act I, Scene i, of the play contains the King's command to bring forth two quar-
reling noblemen: "[t]hen call them to our presence-face to face, and frowning
brow to brow, ourselves will hear the accuser and the accused freely speak .. "
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988)(quoting WILLkM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD
II act 1, sc. 1). Unfortunately, the lines provide less support than Eisenhower's
remarks for the crucial importance of physical confrontation. Their importance
rests on two dubious assumptions: first, that two lines of Shakespeare can be
taken to exemplify the jurisprudence of either his own or King Richard's time;
and second, that the playwright was concerned with recording such jurisprudence
for posterity, rather than writing good lines of blank verse. (If this is so then the
Butcher's exhortation in Henry VI, Part II, IV:-"The first thing we do, let's kill
all the lawyers"-becomes especially dangerous). It is true that the Court used
this quote not as a reference to legal precedent but to define "confrontation" and
to show the antiquity of the belief in the justness of face-to-face confrontation.
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1018 n.2 (1988). However, even if this is all these two
lines stand for, reading further to the resolution of the scene actually demon-
strates the inconsistency of using this quotation: "[there shall your swords and
lances arbitrate. The swelling difference of your settled hate. Since we cannot
atone you, we shall see Justice design the victor's chivalry." WILLIAM SHAKE-
SPEARE, RICHARD II act 1, sc. 1. In spite of the fact that the two opposing parties
were called together "face to face" before King Richard, the trier of fact, they
could not reach an agreement and were instructed to prepare for trial by com-
bat-the more common means of "confrontation" and trial in King Richard's
time-to determine which was telling the truth. Id.
168. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1018 (1988)
169. The opinion offers two "common-sense" assertions which do not reflect the find-
ings of empirical research: "[iut is always more difficult to tell a lie about a person
'to his face' than 'behind his back,'" since "even if the lie is told, it will often be
told less convincingly." Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988). "The Confronta-
tion Clause does not, of course, compel the witness to fix his eyes upon the de-
fendant; he may studiously look elsewhere, but the trier offact will draw its own
conclusions." Id. (emphasis added). These quotes illustrate the judicial process,
reliance on demeanor evidence without consideration of the findings of empirical
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physical confrontation on an equal footing with cross-examination-
the one designating an explicit right, the other designating a right im-
plicit in the Sixth Amendment-in its ability to ensure the "integrity
of the fact-finding process." 7 0 Finally, Scalia specifically noted that
previous holdings on the appropriateness of exceptions to other,
merely implicit, confrontation elementsl71 could not expand to sub-
sume the literal right of physical confrontation.172 Nevertheless, ex-
ceptions to this "most literal application"73 might be found, as long as
they are "firmly... rooted in [the Court's] jurisprudence,"7 4 and they
"further an important public policy."175 In sum, Coy held that the
Clause "guarantee[s] the accused the right to a literal face-to-face con-
frontation with the witness who testified against him at trial at least in
the absence of a specific showing of need,"176 and the need must be of
sufficient import to more overarching concerns.1 77
The dissent in Coy78 is relevant to the present discussion of de-
meanor evidence, for it correctly points out the flaw mentioned
above'7 9 in not only the majority's, but in the prevailing juridical view-
point. Noting that the appellant's only grievance was that the testify-
ing victims were unable to observe him during their testimony, the
dissent highlighted the fact that the concealing screen "did not pre-
vent the girls from seeing and being seen by the judge and counsel, as
well as by the jury,"S0 even after the witnesses were informed that
the appellant could see them and hear their testimony.' 8 ' Writing for
the dissent, Blackmun quoted both California v. Green's'8 2 assertion
research. No better instance of the judicial process' reliance on improper aspects
of demeanor-a witness' gaze and facial gestures-could be adduced.
170. Id. at 1020 (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736 (1987)).
171. Id. Explicitly noted are cases dealing with these exceptions such as Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)(right to cross-examine); Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, 63-65 (1980)(right to exclude out-of-court statements); Kentucky v.
Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987)(right to face-to-face confrontation at proceedings
other than actual trial)).
172. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988).
173. Id. at 1021.
174. Id. (quoting Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987)).
175. Id. at 1021. See also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980); Chambers v. Missis-
sippi, 410 U.S. 284,295 (1973). Justice O'Connor, concurring, emphasized the like-
lihood of such exceptions, noting precedent which held that to consider the right
to face-to-face confrontation absolute was "unintended and too extreme." Coy v.
Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1025 (1988)(quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980)).
She, too, stressed, however, the established "preference for face-to-face confron-
tation at trial." Id. at 1024 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980)).
176. Tennessee v. Deuter, 839 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tenn. 1992).
177. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
178. Justice Blackmun authored the dissent and was joined by the Chief Justice.
179. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
180. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1027 (1988)(emphasis added).
181. Id.
182. 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
1993] 1185
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
that the Clause was designed in part "to compel the defendant 'to
stand face to face with the jury;' "183 and Wigmore's conviction that
one element of the confrontation right is
the presence of the witness before the tribunal so that his demeanor while
testifying may furnish such evidence of his credibility as can be gathered
therefrom.... [That principle] is satisfied if the witness, throughout the mate-
rial part of his testimony, is before the tribunal where his demeanor can be
adequately observed. 1 8 4
Thus, for the first time, an opinion (albeit a dissent) recognized that
the important issue in demeanor evidence is not whether the accused
and the witness come face to face, but whether the trier offact is able
to see the result of that presentation.
b. Maryland v. Craig
Coy's fairly rigid procedural framework was relaxed somewhat two
years later, in Maryland v. Craig.18 5 There the Court once more ex-
plicitly recognized that it had never held "that the Confrontation
Clause guarantees criminal defendants the absolute right to a face-to-
face meeting with witnesses against them at trial."186 The Court fo-
cused instead on the substantive reasons for the right in a more inter-
pretive mode of analysis than it took in Coy. Writing for the Court,
Justice O'Connor derived her reasoning "not only from the literal text
of the Clause, but also from [the Court's] understanding of its histori-
cal roots."1 8 7 Noting that Coy had explicitly left open the possibility of
exceptions to the "preference" for physical confrontation, 188 Justice
183. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1028 (1988)(alteration in original).
184. Id. at 1029 (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 84, § 1399 (Chadbourne rev. ed.
1974)(emphasis in original). Blackmun also recognized the importance of cross-
examination, as well as the claim, initially set forth in Mattox, that the Clause's
primary goal should be to prevent anonymous accusers. Id. at 1028.
185. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
186. Id. at 844. (emphasis in original). See also United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616,
reh'g denied, 671 F.2d 1379, cert. denied, 456 U.S 1008 (1982)(confrontation right
not absolute); State v. Plant, 461 N.W.2d 253 (Neb. 1990); State v. DeSantis, 456
N.W.2d 600 (Wis. 1990); Thomas v. People, 803 P.2d 144 (Colo. 1990); Topping v.
People, 793 P.2d 1168 (Colo. 1990); People v. Thurman, 787 P.2d 646 (Colo. 1990);
State v. Chisholm, 777 P.2d 753 (Kan. 1989); Holloway v. State, 594 S.W.2d 2 (Ark.
1980); State v. Monroe, 345 So.2d 1185 (La. 1977). But see United States v. Morris,
485 F.2d 1385 (C.A. Tex. 1973)(right to confront witnesses is absolute); State v.
Hamons, 805 P.2d 6 (Kan. 1991)(confrontation right includes right to physical
confrontation with accuser); State v. Lincoln, 789 P.2d 497 (Haw. 1990)(accused
has basic constitutional right to confront accuser).
187. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844 (1990). Justice Scalia's vitriolic dissent, in
which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined, attacked the majority
opinion for precisely that reason. The dissent believed that the majority
"subordinat[ed] ... explicit constitutional text to currently favored public pol-
icy .... " Id. at 861.
188. See supra notes 171-176, and accompanying text.
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O'Connor analyzed the motivation for the confrontation right to ascer-
tain when such exceptions are appropriate.
The matter of exceptions, however, is not as important for this dis-
cussion as is the Court's holding as to what is important in confronta-
tion. 8 9 The Court's primary holding was that "[t]he central concern
of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence
against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the
context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact."'190 Quot-
ing Mattox and Green, the Court determined that that guarantee is
accomplished by the combination of four elements of confrontation:
"physical presence, oath, cross-examination, and observation of de-
meanor by the trier of fact."19 ' Because these elements were present
in some form in Craig, the admission of testimony was "consonant"
with the intentions of the Confrontation Clause. 92
Again, this reasoning was based on an interpretive rather than a
literal construction of the Sixth Amendment. By construing, rather
than simply applying, the language of that Amendment, Justice
O'Connor expressed this difference in her holding: "[t]he central con-
cern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evi-
dence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing
in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact."' 93
According to this newest interpretation, then, the four elements of
confrontation ensure that reliability, and "serve the purpose of the
189. It has been established since Mattox that such rights under the Confrontation
Clause can be regulated if an overriding public policy exists. See supra part III.
D. iv. The exception question in Craig, therefore, focused on whether guarding a
child victim of sexual abuse from the trauma of testifying before her assailant
was an important enough concern as to so limit the confrontation right. Mary-
land v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
190. Id. at 845 (emphasis added). The debate was thus moved from the procedural
arena to the substantive. See supra note 88. See also Kentucky v. Stincer, 482
U.S. 730, 739 (1987) ("the right to confrontation is a functional one for the purpose
of promoting reliability in a criminal trial"); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540
(1986)(confrontation guarantee serves "symbolic goals" and "promotes reliabil-
ity"); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)(plurality opinion)("the mission of
the Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical concern for the accuracy of the
truth-determining process in criminal trials by assuring that 'the trier of fact has
a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the [testimony]' ").
191. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 946 (1990). See also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,
69 (1980)(oath, cross-examination, and demeanor provide "all that the Sixth
Amendment demands: 'substantial compliance with the purposes behind the con-
frontation requirement' ")(quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 166 (1970).
Thus, even though Craig and Coy take different approaches to the Clause, both
accord demeanor evidence the same status as cross-examination, the "greatest
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." WIGMORE, supra note 84,
§ 1367.
192. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 857 (1990).
193. Id. at 845.
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Confrontation Clause."194 Whether the confrontation right is viewed
as procedural or as substantive, the presumption endures that the sim-
ple act of confronting an accused with the witnesses against him will
inherently augment the accuracy and truth of the witnesses' testi-
mony. This is the fundamental premise of every confrontation clause
opinion and analysis,1 95 and it is a millstone around the neck of the
very process it is designed to advance.
However, there is evidence in Craig of an attitude which would al-
low for changes that would alleviate the problem of this erroneous
presumption. The majority's explicit admission that the right to, and
the need for, physical confrontation must "be interpreted in the con-
text of the necessities of trial and the adversary process"19 s invokes
the important concession in Roberts that any inquiry must "build on
past decisions, draw[] on new experience, and respond] to changing
conditions."197 The "new experiences" and "changing conditions" of
novel and relevant knowledge gleaned from professional, persuasive
social science studies are exactly what must be applied in these inquir-
ies. Just as advances in medical and other "hard" sciences can be and
are taken into account in Constitutional analyses, 198 so too should rel-
evant social science research be used in the process of judicial
reasoning.
E. Summary
It is clear that demeanor evidence is a barnacle firmly fastened to
numerous areas of the judicial system. As described above, a plethora
of commentators and trial practitioners have urged numerous meth-
ods of manipulating witnesses into exhibiting those telltale indicators
which are associated with deception. Further, the entrenched belief
goes beyond the notion that "[t]he importance of demeanor to the jury
is one of the rationales for the hearsay rule and the sixth amendment
confrontation guarantee." 199 The belief encompasses the notion that a
criminal defendant's demeanor on the stand is probative of his truth-
fulness and his entire ethos, and can and should be used in determin-
ing his prospects for rehabilitation or even whether his sentence
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966
(1976)(clause requires safeguards of reliability).
196. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849 (1990).
197. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980)(emphasis added).
198. The most obvious examples are the discussions of emergent medical technology
and beliefs in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990)(right of vegetative patient's relatives to demand withdrawal of treatment);
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989)(abortion); and Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)(abortion).
199. Imwinkelreid, supra note 52, at 186 n.34.
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warrants an increase.200 Such is the status of demeanor evidence in
the legal profession to date. With few exceptions the case law has ac-
cepted its use and importance at face value, and commentators have
primarily focused on methods of exploiting this belief.201
Substantial evidence, amassed from studies conducted by social
psychologists and others, indicates that the mechanism underlying de-
meanor evidence-judging a person's credibility by his or her outward
behavior, manner or conduct-promotes faulty judgments and greatly
disserves the truth-seeking process. The next section of this paper re-
views this evidence. It examines social science research which demon-
strates that simple alterations to the form of the law's approach to
such credibility judgments and instructions, would lead the legal com-
munity back onto the truth-seeking path from which it has strayed.
IV. DEMEANOR AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
While deception and the act of lying have been analyzed in a vari-
ety of different ways--evolutionary, 02 physiological, 203 social,204 utili-
tarian,205 and others-it was not until relatively recently that the
axiomatic assumptions about deception and the use of demeanor were
addressed empirically. This approach began about two decades ago
when Ekman and Friesen developed a model of nonverbal behavior
which categorized various actions into different channels: face, body,
and voice.206 The important concept derived from this model was that
200. E.g., United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978); United States v. Beaulieu, 900
F.2d 1537 (10th Cir. 1990)(judge's determination that defendant committed per-
jury based on personal observation of defendant's demeanor, which gives ade-
quate "indicia of reliability").
201. Professor Welborn is virtually alone in addressing the possible misuse of this
principle. See Wellborn, supra note 1. But see Michael Saks, Enhancing and Re-
straining Accuracy in Adjudication, 51 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 262-64
(1988)(addressing problems with demeanor evidence). The topic is treated more
thoroughly, however, in the social science literature. See infra part IV.
202. See, eg., Charles F. Bond, Jr. et al., The Miscommunication of Deception: An
Adaptive Perspective, 21 J. ExPERimCENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 331 (1985); RICHARD C.
LEAKEY & ROGER LEWIN, PEOPLE OF THE LAKE: MANKIND AND ITS BEGINNINGS
(1978).
203. See, e.g., Kevin R. Murphy, Detecting Infrequent Deception, 72 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 611 (1987); David T. Lykken, Psychology and the Lie Detector Industry,
29 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 725 (1974).
204. See, e.g., SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE
(1978).
205. See, e.g., Bella M. DePaulo, Success at Detecting Deception: Liability or skill?
Paper presented at the conference on the Clever Hans Phenomenon, New York
Academy of Sciences, New York, May 1980.
206. See Paul Ekman & Wallace V. Friesen, The Repertoire of Nonverbal Behavior:
Categories, Origins, Usage, and Coding, 1 SEMIOTICA 49 (1969); Paul Ekman &




these channels are differentially controllable. One channel may be
less difficult to control than another and may exhibit less information
about the speaker's discourse than another more "leaky" channel. In
non-deceptive discourse, a controllable channel can send a great deal
of information; in deceptive discourse it can hide just as much. In gen-
eral, "the channel which is most informative when the communicator
is truthful is most misleading when the communicator is deceptive." 207
The primacy of facial gestures and expressions208 (of which senders
are usually aware, transmit a large amount of information relatively
rapidly, and are of primary focus for receivers) indicates that the face
is the most easily controlled channel of communication, and it thus
hides or reveals the most information. 209 Based on a variety of ana-
tomical and sociocultural factors, Ekman and Friesen claimed that the
body is less controllable or "leakier" than other channels of communi-
cation.210 Other studies have demonstrated that the voice is even less
controllable than the body,211 that it is actually the "leakiest" of the
three channels.212
Thus, since the inception of the "channel" model, much deception
research has focused on whether the model holds true for observers
trying to detect hidden information such as deception. That is, the
"telltale indicators" axiom has been put to empirical testing. The
most common paradigm has involved the presentation to subjects of
videotapes of speakers both lying and telling the truth, and subjects
must then judge the speakers' veracity.213 Subjects are exposed to a
video containing either the full video and audio cues or some permuta-
tion thereof (i.e. only audio; only the speaker's body and audio; only
the speaker's face; only a transcript; etc.), and the subjects' skill at
detecting deception in each of the various conditions is statistically an-
207. Zuckerman et al., supra note 13, at 5.
208. Also known as "video primacy," see Bella M. DePaulo et al., Decoding Discrepant
Nonverbal Cues, 36 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 313 (1978).
209. Zuckerman et al., supra note 13, at 5, Ekman & Friesen, supra note 206.
210. See Ekman & Friesen, supra note 206.
211. See, e.g., B. DePaulo, V. Leiphart, & W. Dull, Help-seeking and Social Interaction:
Person Situation, and Process Considerations, Paper presented at the interna-
tional conference on the Development and Maintenance of Prosocial Behavior.
Warsaw, Poland, July, 1980.
212. See, e.g., Miron Zuckerman et al., Controlling Nonverbal Displays: Facial Expres-
sions and Tone of Voice, 17 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 506 (1981).
213. See, e.g., Paul Ekman & Maureen O'Sullivan, Who Can Catch a Liar?, 46 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 913 (1991); Kohnken, supra note 21; Bond et al., supra note 202;
Miron Zuckerman et al., Learning to Detect Deception From Three Communica-
tion Channels, 9 J. NONVERBAL BEHAV. 188 (1985); John E. Hocking et al., De-
tecting Deceptive Communication from Verba Visual, and Paralinguistic Cues,
6 HuM. COMM. RES. 33 (1979); Glenn Littlepage & Tony Pineault, Verba Facia
and Paralinguistic Cues to the Detection of Truth and Lying, 4 PERSONALITY AND
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 461 (1978).
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alyzed.214 Studies have also examined which facial expressions, body
movements or auditory (paralinguistic) cues are most effectively used
by such subjects in detecting the deception.21 5 The expectation has
been that since the voice is a relatively leaky channel through which
information is transmitted more easily than through the face or body,
observers will detect deception with greater accuracy through the
voice than through face or body cues. In their study, Ekman and Frie-
sen predicted that subjects exposed to facial expressions alone would
not be able to detect lies.216
Subsequent studies conducted over the next decade yielded just
such results.217 Two literature reviews218 examined and statistically
214. One obvious problem in generalizing from empirical studies to the courtroom is
that witnesses are not presented to juries on videotape in court, but no study has
observed that this difference presents any problems. Another incidental issue is
that the typical witness stand hides much of a witness's body language from the
jury. This presents no serious problems because the primary focus of the studies
is the difference between facial and vocal cues, and a juror's attention is almost
always focused on either of those two channels rather than the body. See gener-
ally Spigarolo v. Meachum, 934 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1992)(differentiating between fa-
cial and body cues).
According to Professor Wellborn, however, there are four additional factors
which are "important differences between the [typical experiment] and the con-
ditions of a trial." Wellborn, supra note 1, at 1079. These are context (the fact
that a statement is presented in the context of a whole trial, rather than a some-
what more limited experiment); cross-examination (its presence at trial and the
lack of it in psychological experiments); deliberation (the fact that jurors make
consensual rather than individual decisions as to a witness's veracity); and prepa-
ration (witnesses presumably are coached and rehearse their answers, while ex-
perimental subjects respond spontaneously). Id. These factors have potential to
affect an ultimate decision by the jury as to a witness's overall credibility and the
weight to be attributed his testimony. However, juror assessments of demeanor
evidence are individual and are based on clues that leak through a witness's
facade at the moment of deception. This unconscious judgment made at the time
of deception may be altered by subsequent evidence or discussion, but it cannot be
affected by those four factors until after it has been made. Empirical data touch
at least two of these points. See Richard A. Maier & Paul J. Lavrakas, Lying
Behavior and Evaluation of Lies, 42 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLs 575, 580-81
(1976)(group ratings more suspicious than average individual ratings); Glenn E.
Littlepage & Martin A. Pineault, Detection of Deception of Planned of and Spon-
taneous Communication, 125 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 195 (1984)(planned lies detected
less accurately than spontaneous lies). However, Professor Wellborn's approach
still begs the question of demeanor evidence's validity; thus, these four factors are
not ones which tell against the validity of applying these experimental data in
courtroom situations.
215. Zuckerman et al., Nonverbal Strategies for Detecting Deception, Unpublished
manuscript, cited in Zuckerman et al., supra note 13, at 21.
216. See supra notes 209-210.
217. See Miron Zuckerman et al., Facial and Vocal Cues of Deception and Honesty, 15
J. ExpEPmErrTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 378 (1979); Paul Ekman & Wallace V. Friesen,
Detecting Deception From the Body or Face, 29 J. PERSONALrY AND SOC.
PSYCHOL. 288 (1974).
218. DePaulo et al., supra note 13; Zuckerman et al., supra note 13. It should be
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analyzed the previous literature addressing verbal and nonverbal be-
haviors associated with either actual or perceived deception. In both
conditions (actual or perceived), the reviewers examined which spe-
cific facial, body or vocal cues correlated with actual deception. Thus,
the reviews analyzed the entire corpus of psychological literature on
deception to determine which, if any, individual, observable indicia
could predict and identify a speaker's deception. Three important and
lasting sets of findings were empirically established by these reviews:
that certain behaviors occur when a speaker deceives; that there are
qualitative indicia that observers watch for in order to identify decep-
tion; and, most importantly, that there are significant differences be-
tween those two sets of cues.21 9
A. Cues to Actual Deception
The two reviews extracted almost twenty actions or cues from the
welter of previous studies and classified them under either visual or
auditory channels.2 20 These were analyzed in terms of whether, when
a speaker was lying, the action or cue increased or decreased. Fewer
than half of the behaviors were found to be significantly present when
deception occurred, and only three (increases in adaptors,22 ' pupil di-
lation, and shrugs) were from the visual channel.22 2 As might be ex-
pected from the Ekman-Friesen model, not one of the accepted visual
cues-Frank's grimaces or smiles,223 Rains's "furtive glances" and
shifty gaze,224 or nervous blinking,-was observed at a significant level
when speakers lied, and in almost all other behaviors there was an
actual decrease during deception. 225 The studies showed that
some of our favorite cultural stereotypes about liars do not withstand the test
provided by the existing empirical data .... T]he studies that have been con-
remembered that these reviews reflect the findings of a large number of empiri-
cal studies.
219. Zuckerman et al., supra note 13.
220. Behaviors classified as visual included pupil dilation, gaze, blinking, smiling, head
movements, gestures, shrugs, adaptors, foot and leg movements, and postural
shifts. Cues classified as auditory included response latency, response length,
speech rate, speech errors, speech hesitations, pitch, negative statements, irrele-
vant information, and self-references. DePaulo et al., supra note 13; Zuckerman
et al., supra note 13.
221. These include self-manipulations (e.g. S. Finkelstein, The Relationship Between
Physical Attractiveness and Nonverbal Behaviors, Unpublished honors thesis,
Hampshire College (1978)); hand to face gestures (e.g. John E. Hocking & Dale G.
Leathers, Nonverbal Indicators of Deception: A New Theoretical Perspective, 47
COMM. MONOGRAPHS 119 (1980)); and grooming (e.g. Robert E. Kraut & Donald
Poe, On the Line: The Deception Judgements of Customs Inspectors and Laymen,
39 J. PERSONAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 784 (1980)).
222. DePaulo et al., supra note 13, at 340, Zuckerman et al., supra note 13, at 12.
223. See note 50, supra
224. Id. at 17 (Table II).
225. See note 41, supra.
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ducted so far do not support the notion that liars have shifty eyes-nor even
shifty bodies; neither glances nor shifts in posture occur significantly more
often when people are lying compared to when they are telling the truth.2 2 6
In marked contrast, nearly all of those behaviors received via the audi-
tory channel were observed at a significant frequency during decep-
tion.227 This is clearly consonant with a model asserting that the voice
is more leaky than the face, especially since one cue, pitch, is the audi-
tory aspect that is most identified with a person's "voice." 228 Subse-
quent studies have replicated these findings.229 Thus, based on five
decades of research,23 0 the current paradigm reflects that identifiable
cues to deception are present more often in the vocal channel than in
the visual. This is especially so in a comparison of the voice to the
face.
B. Cues to Perceived Deception
The legal perspective assumes that observers know which indicia
to look for in detecting perjury and deception, and that these indicia
are true indicators of deception.231 Other analysis extracted discrete
cues from the corpus of deception studies, to create ten categories of
behaviors that were classified as either visual or auditory. 232 The cru-
cial finding as it relates to the present discussion was that almost twice
226. DePaulo et al., supra note 13, at 339.
227. Auditory cues included speech errors, speech hesitations, response length, pitch,
irrelevant information, negative statements, nonimmediacy, and leveling. Id. at
340.
228. Pitch (or fundamental frequency) and tone of voice which are sometimes used
interchangeably, can be analyzed without reference to the actual words being
spoken. Content-filtering is a process entailing the removal of all frequencies
above or below a given frequency from the stimulus. It leaves the voice stimulus
unintelligible, but most prosodic elements can still be perceived. See, e.g., id. at
329 n.1; Peter Rogers et al., Content Filtering Human Speech: A Simple Elec-
tronic System, 3 BEHAV. REsEARcH METHODS AND INSTRUMENTATION 16 (1971);
John A. Starkweather, Content-free Speech as a Source of Information About the
Speacker, 52 J. ABNORMAL AND Soc. PSYCHOL. 394 (1956). Random splicing in-
volves piecing together dissected bits of a recorded speech into a new auditory
stimulus. Slightly fewer elements are retained through this process than through
content-filtering.
229. See, e.g., Ekman & O'Sullivan, supra note 213; Zuckerman et al., supra note 213;
Littlepage & Pineault, supra note 214; Glenn E. Littlepage et al., Relationship
Between Nonverbal Sensitivities & Detection of Deception, 57 PERCEPTUAL &
MOTOR SKIus 651 (1983).
230. The earliest study reviewed in Zuckerman et al., supra note 13, was F. K. Berrien
& G. H. Huntington, An Exploratory Study of Pupillary Responses During Decep-
tion, 32 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 443 (1943).
231. See supra part IV(A).
232. In this analysis, the visual cues included gaze, smiling, adaptors, and postural
shifts. The auditory cues included response latency, response length, speech rate,
speech hesitations, speech errors, and pitch. DePaulo et al., supra note 13, at 340;
Zuckerman et al., supra note 13, at 17.
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as many cues were related to perceived deception than to actual decep-
tion.233 Consistent with popular and legal conjecture, for example one
of the strongest correlations was a perceived avoidance of gaze: when
speakers avoided others' gaze, observers predicted deception signifi-
cantly more often than not.23 4 Other perceived predictors included
decrease in smiling, increase in postural shifts in the visual channel,
and all auditory cues except for response length.235 These perceived
predictors correspond to those behaviors accepted by the legal profes-
sion as indicative of deception or perjury.23 6 Accordingly, the half-
century of research also resulted in the unsurprising, somewhat pro-
saic finding that empirical data supports popular perceptions about in-
dicators of deception.
C. Differences
The important conclusion from these findings is that those behav-
iors which are popularly believed to manifest a speaker's deception are
qualitatively and quantitatively different than those which are actu-
ally observed during deception. More importantly, neither a witness'
decrease in smiling or his "furtive or meaning glances,"237 two of the
three visual cues associated with perceived deception, were found to
be present at a significant level in actual deception.238 Thus, according
to the empirical evidence, the assumptions as to these indicia are sim-
ply wrong. Moreover, the third visual cue, postural shifts which in-
clude "carriage," 23 9 and "fidgetings or composure," 240 are considered
by observers as an indicator of deception.2 4-1 In reality, during actual
deception, speakers tend to be still and to perform fewer body move-
ments.242 Similar contradictory trends were detected for all other
physical movements. Observers commonly assume that people who
are being deceptive are uncomfortable, shifty, restless in their seats,
and move their heads in all directions so as to avoid an observer's scru-
tiny.243 During actual deception, however, there is in fact a decrease in
each of these behaviors.244 This is probably a direct result of the fact
that people who are being deceptive know which behaviors result in
233. Zuckerman et al., supra note 13, at 17 (Table II).
234. 1& at 17 (Table II).
235. DePaulo et al., supra note 13, at 340: Zuckerman et al., supra note 13, at 17.
236. See supra part If(C).
237. See supra note 41.
238. Zuckerman et al., supra note 13, at 12 (Table I).
239. See supra note 41.
240. See supra note 51.
241. Zuckerman et al., supra note 13, at 17 (Table II).
242. The frequency of this value did not reach statistical significance and was simply
reported as a trend.
243. Zuckerman et al., supra note 13, at 17 (Table II).
244. Zuckerman et al., supra note 13, at 12.
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judgments of deception. If a speaker expects those observing him to
interpret postural shifts as signs of deception, he will try to reduce
such movement.
Clearly, then, reliance by a jury or other trier of fact on observa-
tions of a witness on the stand to identify deception is ineffectual.
Jury instructions on "demeanor" or "manner and conduct" focus ju-
rors' full attention on what they see and obviate most, if not all,
chances that they will accurately detect deception. Worse, where a
trier of fact maintains dependence on these cues, he or she is actually
misled into identifying deception where it may not have occurred.4 5
The psychological literature explicitly sums up the problem with the
legal schema:
Sometimes the cues that [people] should be using ... are cues that they do not
even notice. Other cues that might potentially be quite informative may be
noticed, but regarded as insignificant and therefore ignored, or-worse, yet-
used in exactly the wrong ways .... This less-than-perfect correspondence
between cues that really are indicative of deception (actual cues) and cues that
are believed to be indicative of deception (perceived cues) has important im-
plications .... If a completely innocent truth teller happens to engage in be-
haviors that others perceive as signs of deception ... that person risks being
labeled a liar. Both for liars ... and for truth tellers... it is more important to
know about the cues that people interpret as signs of deceptiveness and truth
than it is to know about the cues that really are signs of deceit.2 4 6
Reliance on the vocal evidence, however, appears to be more valuable.
Most of the behaviors received through the auditory channel that
were associated with perceptions of deception were also observed dur-
ing actual deception: increases in speech hesitations, speech errors,
and in the pitch of a speaker's voice.247
This is, of course, consistent with the channel model described
above.248 Since the visual channels of face and body are more control-
lable than the leakier voice channel, it is easier for a speaker to con-
ceal useful information from an observer who is focusing on visual
cues. The degree of effort that is used to conceal such information
corresponds to another variable examined in the literature. Prevalent
assumptions in law about a witness being exposed to aspects of a court-
room atmosphere such as Wigmore's "subjective moral effect" 249 par-
allel assumptions that any witness or speaker who lies simply is giving
a false answer, without regard to the cognition that goes on behind the
245. This creates the difficulties discussed in supra part III(A). Additionally, if a juror
takes an instruction regarding falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus literally, it is
conceivable that, based on an nervous eye twitch, stammer, or posture shift at any
time during a witness's testimony, he will disregard that witness's entire
testimony.
246. DePaulo et al., supra note 13, at 343 (emphasis added).
247. Id. at 340; Zuckerman et al., supra note 13, at 17.
248. See supra notes 206-212 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 99 and 156 and accompanying text.
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content of the answer. There is, however, a definite hierarchy of de-
ception, in which one lie may have greater importance or immediacy
to the witness than another.250 Based on the position that the particu-
lar act of deception occupies in that hierarchy, a speaker may be more
or less motivated to deceive his audience, and to exert more or less
effort to conceal his misrepresentation.
This phenomenon is reflected in the studies which divide analyses
of actual deception into high and low motivation conditions.251 The
high motivation condition, of course, is most pertinent to a discussion
of courtroom deception, as lies which most affect admissible evidence
in a case are important and are told to deceive a jury.252 These studies
also produced results that contradict the accepted beliefs of the legal
system. Head and body movements decreased significantly during
high motivation deception, indicating that when a lie is of greater im-
portance to a speaker, the speaker can effectively control those behav-
iors which are easily masked or controlled.253 The less controllable
channel of voice showed a similar pattern. Under low motivation,
there was a very small, non-significant trend toward an increase in
pitch, while high motivation conditions were associated with a signifi-
cant and expected increase in pitch.254 This evidence supporting the
controllability of the visual channel relative to the vocal has also been
250. For example, a witness may view a lie about the defendant's activities on the
night in question as more or less important than a lie about the clothes the de-
fendant was wearing on the night in question. Similarly, a witness who lies by
omission to avoid drawing attention to what he perceives as an insignificant detail
may be less motivated to lie than a career criminal whose liberty may be at stake
if he tells the truth.
251. Since most research is conducted at universities, many subjects are college stu-
dents, and their participation in experiments is required for course credit. In
these cases, performance motivation may be fairly low. Some university experi-
menters use monetary incentives to compensate their subjects. Subjects receive
higher monetary rewards the more they detect deception or successfully deceive
others, and performance motivation is also higher. Some studies entail deliberate
misrepresentation about their methodologies, and subjects are told that success in
the experiment is directly related to job success in their chosen professions to
increase performance motivation.
252. [I]t can be argued that many-perhaps even most-of the lies perpe-
trated in everyday life (e.g. insincere compliments, dissimulations of in-
terest in soporific conversations) are ... uninvolving and unarousing....
Still, there are important instances in which the stakes for success at
deceit are quite high (e.g. in responding to a spouse's accusations of infi-
delity or in testifying in a murder trial).
Bella M. DePaulo et al., Detecting the Deceit of the Motivated Liar, 45 J. PERSON-
ALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 1096 (1983)(emphasis added).
253. Zuckerman et al., supra note 13, at 12-14. Changes in frequency of the visual cue
of blinking illustrate this control. Overall, there was a non-significant increase in
blinking during actual deception; however, under low motivation lying, this trend
became significant, and under high motivation deception, there was a significant
decrease in blinking. Id.
254. Id. at 12.
1196 [Vol. 72:1157
DEMEANOR EVIDENCE
corroborated over the past decade.25 5 The interesting aspect of this
empirical substantiation is that even subjects who were highly moti-
vated to lie were relatively unsuccessful in concealing their deception
when observers were exposed to nonverbal vocal cues (e.g. tone of
voice), and not just to words and visual cues.256 Thus, "in deceptive
contexts in which senders' nonverbal cues are showing, the harder
senders try to get away with their lies, the less successful they will
be."257 This reasoning applies to the courtroom environment, and it
may facilitate the use of demeanor evidence, whether the trier of fact
realizes what happens or not. However, as mentioned previously, this
can all too easily be a function of where the trier of fact's attention is
focused. If a juror pays too much attention to the visual or verbal cues
at the expense of nonverbal indicia like tone of voice, the ability to
detect deceit will plummet.258 Further, the degree to which the
speaker's failure to detect occurs will bear a direct relation to the lack
of controllability of the channel in question.2 59
There thus exists powerful evidence from social science studies
which demonstrates that the construct of demeanor evidence as ag-
grandized by the law is invalid as it stands. When a juror is told that
he may use a witness's conduct, manner, bearing or demeanor in order
to assess that witness' credibility, the juror will attempt to use cues
and behavior which actually mislead him and cause him to conclude
that a witness is perjurious more often than the juror should. This
evidence has been accessible to attorneys, jurists, and policymakers for
years, and it has been repeatedly corroborated.
D. Jurors' Attentional Biases
Such corroboration illustrates that empirical research on deception
has much to offer the law in assessing the validity of demeanor evi-
dence. The studies are equally applicable to another aspect of the
topic. Recent data indicate that certain jury instructions create even
more difficulty for jurors in their attempts to identify perjury by fo-
cusing their attention on misleading or false cues.260 Three related
problems with jurors' focus during testimony illustrate this problem.
First, jurors are often given the preliminary instruction that they
should presume that any witness testifying is honest and answers the
255. See Ekman & M. O'Sullivan, supra note 213.
256. DePaulo et al., supra note 252. When subjects were able to use tone of voice cues,
their accuracy in identifying deception was markedly higher than when they re-
lied on visual or verbal cues only.
257. DePaulo et al., supra note 13, at 334.
258. See, discussion infra, parts IV(D) & V.
259. This is consistent with the channel mode discussed supra notes 206-212.
260. Bella DePaulo et al., Attentional Determinants ofSuccess at Detecting Deception
and Truth, 8 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 273 (1982).
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questions put to him truthfully.261 However, it has been shown that
when an observer operates under such an assumption, his or her reli-
ance on the face for cues to a speaker's underlying thoughts in-
creases.2 62 That is, "[a] priori beliefs that the target is telling the truth
increases reliance on facial cues" 26 3 relative to other indicia. This is
clearly detrimental to a successful detection of deception, as facial
cues are misleading identifiers of deception. Second, the same study
found that "suspicion of deception led subjects to discount the readily
faked face more than the leakier voice and body."264 When subjects
were led to believe that the stimulus speaker's discourse would in-
volve deception, the subjects fell prey to fewer misleading visual
cues.
2 6 5
Finally, a fascinating study conducted a decade ago revealed that
juror perceptions of deception can be altered through instructions con-
cerning the appropriate aspects of witness testimony on which to fo-
cus. 2 66 The study proceeded from the premise, demonstrated by the
review by Zuckerman and colleagues,267 that when observers have ac-
cess to behavioral cues which include words and paralinguistic cues
such as tone of voice, they are far more skilled at detecting deception.
Acknowledging that previous studies had presented the speakers' dis-
course in discrete or combined channels (e.g. only voice, only face,
etc.),2 6s DePaulo and associates approached their study from a more
pragmatic perspective:
261. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1040 (7th Cir. 1988)(holding that
following instruction was not improper: "[i]n weighing the testimony of witnesses
... we start out assuming that the witness will speak the truth"). Moreover, the
assumption that a speaker is sincere-that the message he tries to impart is truth-
ful, clear, unambiguous, and relevant-is a fundamental societal one. H. P. Grice,
Logic and Conversation in 3 SYNTAX AND SEMANTIcs 41 (Peter Cole & Jerry L.
Morgan eds., 1975). An assumption that a speaker tells the truth is routine and
unexceptional. See Bella M. DePaulo et al., Humans as Lie Detectors, 30 J.
COMM. 129 (1980).
262. Zuckerman et al., supra note 40.
263. Id. at 180.
264. Id., quoted in Zuckerman et al., supra note 13, at 21.
265. Thus, it may be that suspicion of deception aids in focusing an observer's atten-
tion to leaky or useful cues to deception. Several recent researchers have ex-
amined the "Othello error" a phenomenon in which a suspicious observer
discounts cues of a speaker's veracity in order to conform his perceptions to his
schema of presumed deception. See, Charles F. Bond, Jr., & William Fahey, False
Suspicion and the Misperception of Deceit, 26 BRrrISH J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 41 (1987);
PAUL EKMAN, TELLING LIES: CLUES TO DECEIT IN THE MARKETPLACE, POLITICS,
AND MARRIAGE (1985); Carol Toris & Bella M. DePaulo, Effects of Actual Decep-
tion and Suspiciousness of Deception on Interpersonal Perceptions, 47 J. PERSON-
ALrrY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 1063 (1984).
266. Bella M. DePaulo et al., Attentional Determinants of Success at Detecting Decep-
tion and Truth, 8 PERSONALrrY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 273 (1982).
267. Zuckerman et al., supra note 13.
268. DePaulo et al., supra note 266, at 274.
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information does not come packaged in such neat, separate bundles... a more
realistic-and very straightforward-test of the special utility of vocal cues in
deception-detection attempts ... involve[s] a paradigm in which all subject
have full audiovisual access to the deceivers, but are given different instruc-
tions about where to direct their attention.2 69
Thus, utilizing an environment that was more similar to both real life
and a courtroom, the researchers investigated an issue with important
relevance to courtroom assessments of credibility. Subjects were
presented with videotapes of speakers who were either speaking
truthfully or attempting to deceive. Each videotape had full auditory
cues. The important variation in this experiment was that "[s]ubjects
were instructed to pay particular attention to the senders' tone of
voice, their words, or their visual cues ... ."270 Consonant with the
experimenters' predictions, 271 those subjects who had been given ex-
plicit instructions to concentrate on the speakers' tone of voice were
significantly more skilled at discriminating truths from lies.272 Those
who were told to pay close attention to visual behaviors (i.e. those who
were given the equivalent of a demeanor instruction) performed no
better than those who were given no instructions at all and markedly
worse than those who were instructed to focus on vocal or paralinguis-
tic cues.273 The obvious implications are that: "[f]irst, tone of voice...
may serve as a particularly good indicator of deception. Second, the lie
detector must adopt an attend-to-tone strategy in order to take advan-
tage of the available information." 274 Specific instructions to an ob-
server or juror concerning the aspect of speaker or witness behavior or
testimony to which he should attend can drastically alter that ob-
server's perceptions of credibility.
E. Level of Planning
One final finding having applicability to the courtroom concerns
judgments by observers as to the level of planning that a speaker
evinces. On the one hand, it has been shown that discourse with more
hesitations and more errors is significantly associated with both per-
269. Id. (emphasis added).
270. Id. To ensure empirical validity, one group of subjects was given no instructions
at all and was presented with the videotape. This group represented what is
known in experimental research as the "control" group. Control groups detect
influences by factors other than the variables being examined. They increase the
validity of empirical research.
271. These predictions were based in part on the models discussed previously and on
earlier research for which this experiment provided support. See Glenn E. Lit-
tlepage & Martin A. Pineault, Detection of Truthful and Deceptive Interpersonal
Communications Across Information Transmission Modes, 114 J. SOC. PSYCHOL.
57 (1981).
272. DePaulo et al., supra note 266, at 276.
273. DePaulo et al., supra note 266.
274. Zuckerman et al., supra note 13, at 22.
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ceived and actual deception.275 However, there is abundant evidence
as well that a response that seems planned or rehearsed actually ap-
pears more deceptive to an observer.276 Current research continues to
explore this dilemma.
F. Summary
Social psychology has engaged in empirical review of the act of de-
ception and its detection for decades. Repeatedly, these studies have
produced findings that run counter to both popular and jurispruden-
tial attitudes about the methods of identifying a liar.277 Evidence dem-
onstrates that there are some behaviors that are predominantly
displayed when a speaker attempts to deceive another and that there
are some behaviors which are ordinarily identified as betokening such
deception. However, these sets of behaviors have little in common. In
fact, it has been shown that some of those behaviors the increase of
which is commonly believed to indicate deception-those comprising
visual indicia such as avoidance of gaze, postural shifts or head move-
ments-actually occur less often in those attempting to deceive, while
those behaviors that fall in the vocal or, especially, the paralinguistic
category such as tone of voice, are actually more helpful in identifying
deception. This is due to the relative controllability and leakiness of
the separate channels.
Further, incongruous findings have been put forth as to whether a
response that appears rehearsed or spontaneous will elicit a judgment
of deception or not from an observer, whether suspicious or not. Fi-
nally, whether an observer suspects deception and on what aspect of a
speaker's discourse his attention is focused, will markedly affect that
observer's skill at identifying deception. When an observer is suspi-
cious, his attention tends, consciously or not, to be drawn to the vocal
and paralinguistic cues which aid in deception detection, while the
vastly more common assumption of truth-telling focuses attention on
the face and other visual cues which detract from the ability to discern
deceit. Explicity drawing an observer's attention to one or the other
category can benefit or harm his chances of detecting such deceit
appropriately.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LAW
The perspective of hundreds of years of jurisprudence on de-
meanor evidence is clear, as is the substantial evidence from the body
275. DePaulo et al., supra note 13, at 340.
276. See Zuckerman et al., supra note 13, at 18-19. These findings emphasize the dis-
cussions above regarding planning and rehearsal at trial. See supra note 62 and
accompanying text.
277. Zuckerman et al., supra note 13; DePaulo et al., supra note 13.
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of social science research regarding its inutility. Consequently, what
implications does that research have for the legal perspective?
Surely the most conspicuous consequence of such data is the need
for a reassessment of the current assumptions and jury instructions on
demeanor evidence. First, it must be acknowledged that prevailing
findings overwhelmingly indicate that the assumption that "ordinary
people... will make significantly more accurate judgments of credibil-
ity if they have the opportunity to view the demeanor of a witness
than if they do not"278 is simply false. Observers can actually be mis-
led and fooled into making significantly less accurate judgments as to a
speaker's deceit when they watch a witness' behavior. They are, how-
ever, better able to identify deception when they make use of indicia
by which a witness unconsciously "leaks" hidden informtion, such as
vocal and paralinguistic cues.
The problem with current judicial instructions and assumptions is
that they tend to focus fact-finders' attention on those cues which are
misleading and unhelpful. What such instructions should do instead is
expressly indicate to finders of fact that there are more effective in-
dicators by which to identify deceit and upon which they should focus;
that this shift in attention is highly useful was shown by DePaulo and
her colleagues a decade ago. 279 Thus, a simple alteration in the in-
struction on making judgments regarding credibility would aid signifi-
cantly in making such judgments. In place of an instruction to watch
the "manner and conduct" of a witness in order to be alerted to decep-
tion, one which instructs fact-finders to pay attention instead to the
sound of a witness' voice would be far superior in situations which
require particular emphasis on exposing deception or assessing credi-
bility.280 This "simple suggestion to attend to tone can increase the
degree to which people discriminate truth from deception" 28 1 and will
by definition aid the truth-seeking process. If this runs too far counter
to jurists' parochial attitude, then at the very least, any instruction
which does tend to focus a fact finder's attention on a witness's visual
aspects should be discontinued.
This restructured perspective impacts profoundly on at least two
aspects of the legal process previously discussed, sentence enhance-
ments based on perjury and cases appertaining to Confrontation
278. Wellborn, supra note 1, at 1075.
279. See DePaulo, et. al., supra note 13.
280. Since, as noted in Part III, supra, this runs counter to popular perception, it may
be advisable to refer to the profusion of empirical evidence which supports it.
While some may argue that this would cause the jury to accord the instruction
disproportionate weight, simply because "science says so," it should be noted that
such mounting corroborative evidence precisely satisfies the standards for expert
or other scientific testimony at trial. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
281. See DePaulo et. al., supra note 13, at 277.
1993] 1201
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Clause issues.282 Remedies for the former are simple; it is clear that
much more care should be taken with the former; with the prevailing
popular position it is all too easy to make mistaken or naive credibility
judgments with unwarranted ramifications.
In Confrontation Clause cases, however, the analysis must be
somewhat more penetrating. A juxtaposition of views must be con-
structed. First, it must be understood that actual physical confronta-
tion-that is, a witness' live testimony-can enhance credibility
judgments by the finder of fact. It must also be realized, however, that
this is not a function-and was not the original intent of the right-of
forcing the witness to view the defendant, with the hopes that he
would break down and confess his duplicity. Thus, screens or closed-
circuit television arrangements which hide a defendant from the wit-
ness' view should not be the dispositive issues that they have been in
confrontation clauses cases, insofar as demeanor evidence is con-
cerned.28 3 Nor is it a function of exposure to a tribunal-surely "ca-
reer criminals" who are present relatively often before a judge will
not so succumb to the majesty of a courtroom atmosphere. Rather, as
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Coy correctly implies, detection of de-
ception is solely a function of the accessibility of the fact-finder to the
witness and his behavior. Under conditions present in cases such as
Coy, perhaps the ideal arrangement would be a screen which hides the
defendant from the witness (after the witness has been told that the
defendant can see her), and the witness from the jury, who can then
focus on her voice in assessing credibility!28 4 The importance to poli-
cymaking of a proper understanding of what is useful and what is not
in assessing the credibility of a live witness cannot be overstated.
Finally, the most important issue relating to reliance on demeanor
evidence in case law is the deference to be accorded the trial court's
findings as to credibility by courts of higher review.28 5 Empirical re-
search does to some extent seem to support this deference.286 While
fact-finders at trial may attend to the wrong indicia of perjury or de-
282. See Parts III(A) and III(D), supra.
283. All that is necessary is for the witness to know that a defendant can see him or
simply knows that he is testifying. This information will satisfy those who still
subscribe to Wigmore's "profound moral effect."
284. The extreme precaution of putting all witnesses in masks, as one author half-
seriously suggests, may not be quite necessary (though, strictly speaking, it has
the potential to improve assessment of credibility). Saks, supra note 201, at 264.
285. See Wellborn, supra note 1, § IV(B); FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)("[f]indings of fact [by
the trial court] shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the
witnesses"); 9 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2586, at 737 (1971)(to set aside finding based on trial judge's
evaluation of conflicting testimony requires "most unusual circumstances"); Uni-
versal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 495-96 (1951).
286. See supra notes 227-230.
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ceit, if they pay attention to those cues that have been shown to be
useful in deception detection, then their findings are due some defer-
ence by reviewing courts. This deference, however, is subject to a
point raised by Professor Wellborn.28 7 While his faith in demeanor
evidence is somewhat exaggerated,288 he properly raises the question
as to whether an appellate court can effectively judge credibility as-
sessments from a "cold" transcript of a lower court proceeding. If de-
meanor evidence is useful, of course, then greater deference must be
accorded a lower court's findings than if it is not. A problem arises
when it is shown that such evidence can be categorized as genuinely
useful indicators of perjury or deceit (e.g. paralinguistic cues) or
unuseful (e.g. visual cues).
This is a problem because research has shown that observers ex-
posed to a witness' voice are able to judge deceit best, and those ex-
posed to merely a transcript and no "demeanor cues" do almost as
well, up to twice as well as those who are exposed to visual cues.28 9
Thus, there is support for the claim that findings of credibility could
be reviewed de novo by appellate courts.290
Professor Wellborn raises one of the strongest arguments against
the claim by drawing attention to the "clear error" standard of re-
view.291 He correctly points out that legislative and jurisprudential
history do not premise such review solely on the fact-finder's access to
demeanor evidence.292 A standard less demanding than clear error re-
flects poorly on the dignity and jurisdiction of the appellate courts.293
Review should "encourage appeals that are based on a conviction that
the trial court's decision has been unjust; [not] appeals that are based
on the hope that the appellate court will second-guess the trial
court."294 Further, valid demeanor evidence is certainly not control-
ling: "[flindings that appear clearly incorrect on the basis of the rec-
ord should not be sustained on the theory that they might be premised
upon a witness's demeanor."2 95
An equally problematic aspect of transcript evidence is its quality
and specificity. There is currently dispute as to the accuracy of the
287. Wellborn, supra note 1.
288. While Professor Wellborn correctly interprets the research illustrating the inap-
propriateness of using visual cues as the sole basis for detecting deceit, he consid-
ers the use of other cues equally useless and views demeanor evidence as
completely invalid. As this paper reveals, his claim is too extreme.
289. See DePaulo et al., supra note 13, at 300; John L. Hocking et al., Detecting Decep-
tive Communication from Verbal Visual, and Paralinguistic Cues, 6 HuM.
COmM. RES. 33 (1979).
290. See generally Wellborn, supra note 1, at 1094-96.
291. Wellborn, supra note 1, at 1095-96.
292. Id
293. Id. at 1096 (citations omitted).
294. Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 114 (9th Cir. 1962).
295. Wellborn, supra note 1, at 1096.
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current transcription procedures,296 and the words of a witness must
be captured with absolute precision if credibility judgments are to be
made about him. In addition, even if a transcript is completely accu-
rate in the content of the speech, behaviors which are proven manifes-
tations of deceit, such as speech hesitations or disfluencies, are
typically not preserved in a transcribed record. Thus, any judgment as
to credibility or veracity would of necessity be made based on content
at the appellate level of review. This is certainly not as proficuous a
basis on which to judge veracity as full vocal expression.
VI. CONCLUSION
Credibility judgments can be a fundamental aspect of any case,
civil or criminal, and are often the determining factors at trial.297 It is
unforgivable that the legal system deliberately ignores demonstrated,
relevant findings about demeanor evidence and willfully adheres to an
ineffectual traditional approach. Advances in medical science and in-
vestigative techniques are integrated facilely into the insular legal sys-
tem, and other ad'ances in knowledge should be accepted, as well.
When a conventional juridical policy is demonstrably unhelpful, de-
spite all appeals to precedent or tradition, it should be reassessed in
light of the data which disprove it. Social science has convincingly
demonstrated the disutility of demeanor evidence as misapplied by the
legal community, and its recommendations and solutions should be
recognized by the legal system. Extensive revamping of judicial policy
is not necessary. Rather, simple changes in evidentiary instructions
and the ways in which certain constitutional rights are interpreted
and applied can prevent the mistakes to which current legal assump-
tions about demeanor evidence easily lead. The results of these small
changes can only enhance the truth-seeking process.
296. See e.g., N.Y.L.J., Feb. 10, 1993, at 1.
297. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).
1204 [Vol. 72:1157
